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Transgressing the Border Between
Protection and Empowerment for
Domestic Violence Victims and Older
Children: Empowerment as Protection
in the Foster Care System
Susan Vivian Mangold*
INTRODUCTION
The conference title, Transgressing Borders,' poses interesting interpre-
tations when applied to the field of foster care. I frame my comments in the
debate over what have been identified as the competing rights of protection
and empowerment. I would like to present empowerment of caretakers and
protection and empowerment of children as complimentary goals in the
foster care system. This means family preservation services sensitive to the
complicated dynamics in homes with domestic violence. For older teens,
empowerment by protection requires permanent placement options that al-
low children and their birth families more latitude to plan in cooperation
with child welfare agencies. Both require new and real investment in fami-
lies and caretakers. While this may not be fiscally realistic, it is legally pos-
sible and morally necessary.
From colonial times through twentieth-century Supreme Court action and
more recent federal legislation, the tension between parental
empowerment/autonomy and child protection has been in a shifting balance.
In earlier times, parental authority could not be questioned for the purpose
of protecting children from abuse. However, by the late nineteenth century,
children could be protected by removal via criminal proceedings or philan-
thropic agency actions. More recently, in the 1980's, family empowerment
and protection of children were seen as complimentary, not competing--the
best way to protect children was not by removal but through services which
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo Law School; A.B. Harvard
University, 1982; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1987.
I. Symposium, Transgressing Borders: Women's Bodies, Identities and Fami-
lies, Mar. 31, 2001, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts.
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empowered parents to safely care for their children. In the last few years,
federal law has again shifted the balance toward protection via removal
from the home and swifter termination of parental rights. Amidst this shift-
ing debate, new factors constantly change understandings of the complexi-
ties of family privacy and parental empowerment and the role of the state in
protecting children.
Foster care is defined for this article as out-of-home care agreed to by
parents or ordered by a court following a report of abuse or neglect filed
with a state child welfare agency.2 It is provided by state or local public
agencies directly or by contract with private providers. 3 Federal funds reim-
burse the public agencies creating a federal-state matching system, which
carries federal mandates in exchange for the matching funds.4 Foster care is
therefore a locally provided placement service with some federal regulation
as a result of federal mandates. Foster care can be used in other public sys-
tems such as the mental health system or the juvenile justice system to
house children who cannot be cared for in their own homes.
Foster care is sometimes understood as placement in home-like settings
as opposed to group homes or institutions. I am using the term more broadly
to refer to out-of-home placement of any type for abused and neglected
children. This could include institutional settings, group homes, foster fam-
ily care or supervised independent living arrangements.
Borders separate many classifications with legal significance in the area
of foster care. Most obviously, biological parents as a category have differ-
ent rights and responsibilities expected of them and owed to them than fos-
ter parents or adoptive parents; children in care similarly have specified
rights which are not provided to children cared for in their own homes. Be-
cause of the distinguished mix of presenters on the conference foster care
panel who debate the categories of biological parent, foster parent and
2. For a more complete discussion of the foster care system and the child pro-
tection system which triggers out-of-home care based on abuse or neglect, see Susan
Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law:
The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REv.
1397, 1438-42 (1999).
3 These are usually non-profit private providers, but foster care by for-profit
providers is eligible for federal matching funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (Supp. V
1999). States may contract with over 200 private provider agencies to provide foster
care to abused and neglected children. See Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection, Priva-
tization, and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1313 n.81
(1999).
4. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5106a (Supp. V 1999); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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adoptive parent, I focus on the eligibility borders into and out of the foster
care system and the implications for protection and empowerment of trans-
gressing those borders. Foster care remains the only open-ended entitlement
program,' and as such, it is crucial to carefully consider how the law defines
who may come in, who may go out, who must come in and who must go
out.
In Part I, I draw upon some of my previous writings to summarize the
history, legislation, current operation and representational standards of the
legal system that responds to child abuse and neglect.6 1 include this back-
ground to depict the tensions between protection and empowerment in his-
tory, policy and practice. These tensions are balanced within a context of
gender subordination, racism and classism. While the specifics of the con-
text have changed over time, these three types of discrimination are still
omnipresent and operative in the foster care system.
I discuss the right to protection as developed by constitutional case law
and federal legislation. I use the historical background to highlight the con-
flict which developed between protection of children and empowerment of
parents and also to distinguish the origins of the child protection system
from those of the domestic violence system which has its own historical
development. I draw upon the scholarly and practical debate regarding the
proper model of representation of children to illustrate the tension between
empowerment and protection, especially for older children.
In Part II, I turn to the extension of the definitions of child abuse or ne-
glect to include domestic violence. "Child abuse and neglect" is a phrase
which encompasses a spectrum of child maltreatment from actual serious
injury to possible risk of harm perpetrated by caretakers upon their children.
As discussed infra Part I-C and I-D, each state has its own laws defining
child abuse and neglect within the parameters of federal mandates. 7 Domes-
tic violence similarly encompasses a spectrum of abuse. It is abuse between
adult intimate partners perpetrated to maintain power and control.8
As the comorbidity of domestic violence and child abuse and neglect is
5. For a discussion of the connection between public assistance and foster care
entitlements, see Mangold, supra note 3, at 1310.
6. See Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right
to Protection for Older Foster Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Plan-
ning, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 835 (2000); Mangold, supra note 3, at 1295; Mangold, supra
note 2, at 1397.
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
8. The Power and Control Wheel, which depicts the cycle of power and control
in abusive adult relationships, was developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention
Project, 206 W. Fourth St., Duluth, MN, 55806. See Domestic Abuse Intervention
Project's Power and Control Wheel, reprinted in NANCY K. D. LEMON, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE L. 43 (2001).
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documented and its effects understood, more attention is being placed -on
coordinating the provision of services dealing with domestic violence and
child protection. This coordination has resulted in identification of new
forms of child abuse and neglect based upon the existence of domestic vio-
lence in the home. Domestic violence is a newly recognized form of child
abuse and neglect that creates eligibility for foster care. The issues posed in
recognizing domestic violence as a form of abuse are captured in part, in the
case study of "Rosa" by Zanita Fenton, Chair of the conference's foster care
panel.9 That case study will be referred to in this article when illustrative
and reads as follows:
Rosa
Rosa's mother was the victim of domestic abuse. [Her
husband left all the child care and housework to her, they
argued a lot, he belittled her mother, he insisted on sex
with her even when she had health problems, he isolated
her from friends, he controlled the finances and would
not let her get a job. When she feared that the verbal
abuse was escalating into physical abuse, she decided to
leave, going to a shelter.]
Ten months after Rosa's mother left her father, Admin-
istrative Services (ADS) charged her with neglect for
allowing Rosa to witness domestic abuse: "Respondents
constantly argue in the presence of the child, with the
child intervening and the child ... states that she wished
her parents would not argue as much." ADS placed Rosa
in foster care while the neglect proceedings were pend-
ing.
Charges were added that the mother "admits to being
present when the father would beat the child" and that
she "failed to protect the child from being beaten." Her
mother says that she only told the social worker that she
argued with her husband about spanking Rosa and that
she refused to do so.
In the Rosa case study, ADS charges Rosa's mother with neglect for al-
lowing Rosa to witness verbal domestic violence of her mother by her fa-
ther. "Witnessing domestic violence" is a newly recognized form of child
abuse. The charges against Rosa's mother later include "failure to protect"
for abuse allegedly perpetrated by the father against the child and known to
9. See Zanita E. Fenton, Foster Care: The Border of Family Identity-Maintaining,
(Re)creating, Destroying, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 59 (2001).
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the mother. "Failure to protect" is likewise a new form of child abuse or
neglect based upon the presence of domestic violence in the home.
The presence of domestic violence in the home can now create eligibility
for foster care. Violence between adults in the home is now a type of child
abuse or neglect, which can trigger the legal responses leading to placement
outside the home. The fact that the presence of domestic violence may allow
children to come into temporary foster care for protection has advantages
and disadvantages which are discussed; the fact that exposure to domestic
violence may force some children into foster care against their wishes and
those of their mothers, who may be the ones revealing the violence, has
created a more complicated discussion implicating the advantages and dis-
advantages of the core idea of coordination of the systems. To what extent
should protection of children trump empowerment of mothers? Can we shift
the debate to consider empowerment of mothers and children as the best
permanent and temporary way to protect children?
The history of the legal responses to domestic violence is explained as
necessary background to the convergence and divergence of the domestic
violence and child protective systems in theory and practice. The goal of the
domestic violence system is to empower women; the child protective sys-
tem too often pits mother caretakers against the agency in a purported effort
to protect children. Current statistics and socio-legal responses to domestic
violence are described to lay the groundwork to consider the efforts at coor-
dination of the two systems and the consequences of that coordination.
I conclude this section with suggested reforms to avoid the unintended re-
sults of collaboration and to begin to imagine a system that truly invests in
the empowerment of caretakers in an effort to protect children.
Part III focuses on age as a criteria of eligibility in the foster care system.
While domestic violence can bring a child in, age can force a child out, ob-
jectively ending a child's right to protection. I discuss age as an absolute
limit to the continuation of foster care services, creating ineligibility when a
birthday is crossed. In 1999, Congress estimated that approximately 20,000
teens exited foster care because they had aged-out of the system, reaching
the birthday when they were no longer eligible for foster care benefits. 0
Significantly, none of the nine children in the eight case studies used by the
panel at the conference were about teens in foster care. Older foster children
are never the paradigm and are often forgotten in the system. The eldest
child discussed in the case studies was eleven-year-old Cara, and her case
10. See H.R. 3443, 106th Cong. (1999). As a result of the Foster Care Inde-
pendence Act, discussed infra Part III, states may now continue some benefits to age
twenty-one and receive federal matching funds for them. In some cases, the age of
ineligibility is still eighteen, in others it is twenty-one. See Mangold, supra note 6, at
835.
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raised issues of disabilities more than age. We are not told the age of Rosa.
Yet, for children approaching ineligibility for foster care, age can be the
most relevant factor. Statistics on older children in foster care are presented
in conjunction with recent federal legislation raising the age for discretion-
ary eligibility. As in Part II, I conclude this section with suggestions for
reform to mitigate the harshness of age ineligibility and to imagine a more
flexible spectrum from protection to empowerment.
PART I. THE RIGHT To EMPOWERMENT AND THE RIGHT TO
PROTECTION IN THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
A. Theoretical Framework of the Foster Care System
While parents have a right to raise their children free from state interven-
tion, children have a countervailing right to protection from abuse and ne-
glect. This tension between parental rights and child protection is the key
conflict in the child protection system, but I am interested here in exploring
the unique tensions raised by domestic violence and age ineligibility for
older children in foster care. If the allegations of abuse and neglect are se-
vere enough, federal and state laws aimed at protecting children require that
they be removed from their parents and placed in foster care."' Foster care is
an entitlement, and every state is required by state and federal law to pro-
vide foster care for eligible children.' 2 Foster care provides out-of-home
care for over 500,000 children in the U.S. every day.' 3 Most of these chil-
dren are in foster care as a result of allegations of abuse and neglect against
their parents. 14 A sense of the range of allegations is presented by Professor
Fenton's case studies.
In her now famous and often misunderstood article on children's rights,
Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote in 1973 that "children's rights" was a "slo-
gan in need of a definition."'15 Twenty-seven years later, the notion of chil-
11. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5106 (Supp. 2000); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. 1997)); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994 &
Supp. 1998).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
13. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN: 2000 YEARBOOK
84, 86 (2000). See also STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH
CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 783-90 (Comm. Print
1998) (noting statistics for 1995 and earlier) [hereinafter 1998 GREEN BOOK].
14. See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 13, at 790 (noting statistics for 1995 and
earlier).
15. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV.
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dren's rights is still not well defined. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that
there is no singularly accepted definition or theory of the rights held by
children. The rights claimed tend to be of two general types: those advocat-
ing for children as autonomous persons under the law16 and those placing a
claim on society for protection from harms perpetrated on children because
of their dependency. 17 1 label the first type as the right of empowerment and
the second as the right to protection.
The rights of empowerment for children were advocated in the manner in
which many rights connected with oppressed minorities were pressed in the
1960's. Some children's advocates explicitly cited children as the next
group after blacks and women who were entitled to a revolutionary expan-
sion of rights. 18 Empowerment rights were necessary to recognize children's
equality with adults. They would give children such privileges of citizenry
as the right to vote, work and contract. 19 While children may always hold
empowerment rights, those rights cannot be exercised until the child reaches
a certain level of maturity. 20 While the age at which such an exercise occurs
may vary, the key is that the right of empowerment evolves for each child
from inability to exercise to ability to exercise.
Independent living initiatives21 for teens in foster care seek to enhance the
empowerment rights of children. Unfortunately, the goal of empowerment is
unconnected to any objective assessment, which could continue protective
services. Regardless of a child's maturity and resources, and regardless of
their success in independent living programs, all children are liberated from
487, 487 (1973).
16. See, e.g., JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974), HENRY H. FOSTER,
JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN (1977).
17. See, e.g., Bruce Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their 'Rights', 1976 BYU L. REV.
605 (1976).
18. See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 267, 270 (1995). Minow discusses works such as John Holt's ESCAPE FROM
CHILDHOOD (1974) and Richard Farson's BIRTHRIGHTS (1974) to explain this move-
ment in the 1960's and 70's, but whose origins were derived much earlier in the writ-
ings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey.
19. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 18, at 271; see also, e.g., RICHARD FARSON,
BIRTHRIGHTS (1974).
20. See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment
of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895 (1999) (arguing that developmental issues
are important in considering empowerment rights of children). But see Katherine Hunt
Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing
and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996) (arguing that
empowerment is an important consideration for all children in determining the model
of attorney representation of children).
21. See Independent Living Initiative, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 294 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 677).
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foster care when they reach the age of majority.
Unlike the rights connected with empowerment, protection based rights
evolve in the opposite pattern. The right is strongest at the front end of the
foster care system after cases are investigated and initial placements are
developed. The very young or incompetent have the strongest claim on
these rights, but the ability to exercise them diminishes with maturity. Our
foster care system has been developed to give children a right to protection
until the age of eighteen or, in some cases, twenty-one. At the age of eight-
een or twenty-one, the right to protection is superceded by a right of
empowerment as children mature out of the system whether they are ready
for independence or not.22 Foster care ends when children reach the age of
majority, eighteen or twenty-one, depending on state law and regulations.23
In 1999, Congress estimated that 20,000 teens exited foster care because
they "aged-out" of the system, reaching the age at which eligibility for fos-
ter care benefits is terminated.24
There is tension between the right to protection of abused and neglected
children and the empowerment rights of older foster children. How much
authority should be ceded to older children to determine their services and
placement arrangements? How do we justify terminating needy children
from foster care solely because of their age? Similarly, there is tension
within the domestic violence system and between the domestic violence and
child protection systems over the indeterminant border between protection
and empowerment. Is the goal of the domestic violence system to protect or
empower in the short and long term? How does and should the children's
protective services system interpret its role to protect children while em-
powering caretakers? These core questions regarding protection and
empowerment frame my discussion of age and domestic violence as deter-
minants of eligibility for foster care. Transgressing the border between
empowerment and protection to understand empowerment of older children
and of caretakers as the heart of protection frame my proposed reforms.
22. See Gerald P. Mallon, After Care, Then Where? Outcomes of an Independ-
ent Living Program, 77 CHILD WELFARE 61, 62 (1998) (stating at the outset that
"[P]reparing young people in out-of-home care for independent living and for success-
ful adulthood has not been one of the child welfare system's primary goals.").
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030 (1) (2000) (stating that a child is "any
individual under the age of eighteen years"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-17.4 (a) (1)
(1999) (stating that a child is eligible for foster care if "[t]he person is twenty-one
years old or younger").
24. See H.R. 3443, 106th Cong., (1999). As a result of the Foster Care Inde-
pendence Act, discussed infra, states may now continue some benefits to age twenty-
one and receive federal reimbursement for those foster care benefits.
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B. Supreme Court Cases Developing the Boundaries of the Right to
Protection
25
The right to protection frames the entire child welfare system and much
of the state law governing the state systems, but is not clearly recognized
under constitutional law.26 In 1944, the Supreme Court in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts27 recognized the authority of the state to protect children even when
this infringed upon the legal caretaker's authority. This case was preceded
by Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters28 which voided state
laws limiting parental authority in the choice of schools.
In Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, state laws infring-
ing upon the authority of parents were deemed unconstitutional. The Pierce
court recognized the rights of parents, their duty to their children and the
right to exercise these rights and duties free of state intervention.
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it entirely
plain that the Act of 1922 [mandating that children attend public schools]
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control .... The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his des-
tiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations. 29
This oft-quoted phrase recognizes the rights and duties of parents and the
possible role of the state on behalf of children. The parent-child-state trian-
gular balance is introduced constitutionally. 30 The court in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts built upon the foundation laid by Meyer and Pierce but decided that
the circumstances of the case warranted state intervention to protect the
child. In Prince, parens patriae power of the state to protect children was
upheld. The Prince court held valid a state child labor law against both the
legal guardian's assertion that the law violated her right to raise the child as
she saw fit and the child's right to practice Jehovah Witness beliefs by sell-
ing religious magazines. In discussing the applicable precedents, the court
25. Discussion of these cases summarizes previous writings. See Mangold,
supra note 9, at 844-49; Mangold, supra note 2, at 1402-10.
26. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (deciding that the state does not owe a duty to protect a child from violence at
least until the child is in state custody); infra text accompanying notes 35, 39-42.
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
29. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
30. For a discussion of the balance between parental rights and the state's
authority to intervene into the parent-child relationship, see Mangold, supra note 2, at
1438-42.
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limited the holdings of Meyer and Pierce and recognized the state's ability
to exercise its authority to protect a child's welfare:
Previously in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, this Court had sus-
tained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and
the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance
at public schools. And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, children's rights
to receive teaching in languages other than the nation's common tongue
were guarded against the state's encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose pri-
mary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in
recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of
family life that the state cannot enter .... It is sufficient to show what in-
deed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's wel-
fare .... "
This framework was not constitutionally developed by the Supreme Court
until the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 32 reinforced the authority of par-
ents. That case resulted in a successful challenge to compulsory education
laws imposed on the Amish. In Yoder, parents were convicted under a Wis-
consin law requiring a child's attendance at school until the age of sixteen.
The parents argued that sending their teens to school past the eighth grade
violated their Amish beliefs and lifestyle. The court agreed with the parents
against the state's authority to protect the children in this case.3
Meyer, Pierce, Prince and Yoder all dealt with state intervention to pro-
tect children but were not public family law34 cases dealing with children in
state custody as a result of allegations of child abuse or neglect. In Santosky
v. Kramer,35 and then in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services,36 parental rights and duties and state rights and duties to-
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1943).
32. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33. The rights of children were not explicitly considered by the majority, but
they were raised by Justice Douglas in his dissent. Douglas argued for a remand to
consider the wishes of the children whose parents were convicted under the compul-
sory education law. The weight to be given to their wishes was not stated. Seeking
such input from children could be viewed as granting them empowerment rights over
their parents' control, but Douglas did not detail the authority to be given to their
wishes, nor did he speak in terms of children's rights in his dissent. See Yoder, 406
U.S. at 241 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
34. See Mangold, supra note 2, at 1397. "I coin the phrase public family law to
depict cases where the state has intervened into the 'private' family to assume some
custodial interest from the parents." Id.
35. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
36. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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ward abused and neglected children were addressed by the Supreme Court.
In Santosky, the court held that the standard necessary to involuntarily ter-
minate parental rights was "clear and convincing evidence."37 Even when
children were in the dependency system and their care was subject to proce-
dural safeguards at each juncture, the court found that the importance of the
parental right to the care and control of their child could not be severed ab-
sent a showing by the state of clear and convincing evidence of unfitness. 38
The Santosky court relied on a line of cases, beginning with Meyer, Pierce,
and Prince, to demonstrate historical recognition of parental rights.
[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental lib-
erty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental lib-
erty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood re-
lations are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretriev-
able destruction of their family life.39
In DeShaney,4 ° the rights of parents to raise their children free of state
intervention was upheld over a child's right to protection in a case in which
the facts were deeply challenging to the weight given to parental rights. The
court declined to find a state duty to protect a child who was in the custody
of his father, not in state custody, when the child suffered permanent serious
injury at the hands of his father.4' Winnebago County Department of Social
Services was repeatedly informed of incidents of abuse and the risk of fur-
ther abuse, but the agency did not remove the young child from his father's
care.42 The court reasoned that the state right to intervene, investigate, and
monitor the situation did not implicate a duty to protect the child who re-
mained in his father's care.43 In accordance with the parent-child-state
framework developed in the Meyer-Pierce-Prince line, the state had not
taken on the custodial right and therefore did not hold the accompanying
duty to protect the child. The right of control had been left exclusively to the
father, and the child could not make out a liberty claim for denial of a duty
to protect based on the father's acts of "private violence."
These court cases discuss the parens patriae power of the state to protect
37. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 753.
40. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
41. For a provocative discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment as the more
appropriate cause of action in this case, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky,
Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1359 (1992).
42. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
43. See id. at 197.
2001]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
children but leave blurred where the border of the right to protection exists
amidst the parents' fundamental right to raise their children. None of these
cases discuss children's empowerment rights or the importance of the age
and maturity of the children. Legal doctrine mediating the tension between
protection and empowerment is undeveloped. The boundary for eligibility
for protection is therefore left to myriad state laws within the framework of
federal mandates.
C. History of the Balance Between Protection and Empowerment in
the Foster Care System
44
1. Early Protection of Children
Since the earliest colonial days, some children have needed protection
beyond that which families could provide. Orphans are the obvious children
in need of protection.45 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, children
whose parents did not provide adequate religious or other instruction could
also be removed to insure that the children would grow to be productive
adults.46 Children had no recognized "right" to protection, and physical
punishment was permitted and even required,47 but religion and orderly
44. For a fuller history of child protection before federal legislation to address
child abuse and neglect, see Mangold, supra note 2, at 1397 (summarized in part in this
section).
45. Mary Ann Mason examined the record of two Virginia parishes to provide
demographic information on involuntary apprentices. "Orphans constituted 38.1% of
all child apprentices; 39.3% were classified poor children; 11% were described as
illegitimate; and 12.6% were termed mulatto." Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Ser-
vants: The American Colonial Model of Child Custody and Control, 2 INT'L J.
CHILDREN'S RTS. 317, 326 (1994).
46. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. I,
1600-1865, 27-29 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1970) [hereinafter CHILDREN AND YOUTH,
Vol. 1].
47. The earliest colonial laws included provisions prohibiting excessive corpo-
ral punishment of children. See The Body of Liberties of 1641: The Liberties of the
Massachusetts Collonie in New England, 1641, reprinted in EDWIN POWERS, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: 1620-1692, 543 app. (1966). The Body
of Liberties addressed the issue of the physical punishment of children by their parents
in Chapter 83 stating: "If any parents shall wilfullie and unreasonably deny any childe
timely or convenient marriage, or shall exercise any unnaturall severitie towards them,
such childeren shall have free libertie to complaine to Authoritie for redresse."
WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS: REPRINTED FROM
THE EDITION OF 1672 (1890) (from The Body of Liberties of 1641) (Boston, Rockwell
and Churchill 1890). For a discussion of the English stockholder interests prompting
codification of colonial law see ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
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societal norms prompted early settlers to protect the well-being of children
even against the prerogatives of their fathers.
Colonial fathers were charged with the proper upbringing of their chil-
dren, responsible for educating and training them to be productive citizens
of the community. Fathers who failed to properly instruct their children
could lose custody of the children. a As early as the 1640's, the colonial
laws authorized public authorities to remove children from their families
and place them with other families who could raise them in a manner
deemed appropriate. 9 Colonial laws allowed private intervention into the
parent-child relationship to assure that child rearing was appropriate for
raising employable and moral children. Tightly woven religious communi-
ties provided moral guidance and often acted with public authorities to pro-
vide supervision of family life. °
Forasmuch as the good education of children is of singular behoof and bene-
fit to any Common-wealth; and whereas many parents & masters are too in-
dulgent and negligent of their duty in that kinde. It is therefore ordered that
the Select men of everie town, in the severall precincts and quarters where
they dwell, shall have a vigilant eye over their brethren & neighbours, to fee,
first that none of them shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their families
as not to indeavour to teach by themselves or others, their children & ap-
prentices, so much learning as may inable them perfectly to read the english
tongue, & knowledge of the Capital lawes . . . . Also that all masters of
families doe once a week (at the least) catechize their children and servants
in the grounds & principles of Religion .... And further that all parents and
masters do breed & bring up their children & apprentices in some honest
lawful calling, labour or imployment, either in husbandry, or some other
trade profitable for themselves, and the Common-wealth if they will not or
cannot train them up in learning to fit them for higher imployments.5'
THE PRESENT 21-22 (1987). There is, however, no evidence of colonial fathers being
punished for excessive corporal punishment alone. See Mason, supra note 45; PLECK,
supra. In fact, corporal punishment of children was accepted and encouraged in colo-
nial times. The 1674 Records of the Suffolk County Court record two instances, one
involving Governor Leveret's grandson, where parents were ordered to whip their
children at home in the presence of the constable as punishment for misbehavior by the
children. See POWERS, supra at 178. Even capital punishment for incorrigibility was
codified. The General Laws of Massachusetts Colony, 1658, state that a son who is
"stubborn and rebellious and will not obey [his parents'] voice and chastisement, but
lives in sundry and notorious crimes, such a son shall be put to death." THE GENERAL
LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY 15 (1658) (Capital Laws, ch. 13).
48. See PLECK, supra note 47, at 27-29.
49. See id.
50. See generally PLECK, supra note 47.
51. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE
INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS (1648) reprinted in, THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS 11 (1929).
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In 1642, Massachusetts Bay enacted a law, to be enforced through the
courts, that children could be removed from their parents' home involuntar-
ily, based upon the manner in which parents were raising them. The goal
was not to protect children from abuse but rather to protect society from
poorly raised youth.
And if any of the Select men after admonition by them given to such masters
of families shal finde them still negligent of their dutie in the particulars
aforementioned, whereby children and servants become rude, stubborn &
unruly; the said Select men with the help of two Magistrates, or the next
County court for that Shire, shall take such children or apprentices from
them & place them with some masters for years (boyes till they come to
twenty one, and girls eighteen years of age compleat) which will more
strictly look unto, and force them to submit unto government according to
the rules of this order, if by fair means and former instructions they will not
be drawn unto it.5
2
Such children were removed by the town authorities and placed in an ap-
prenticeship or indenture, called "binding out. ' 53 These indentures, or con-
tracts to bind out children, could be arranged voluntarily by parents seeking
training for their children or involuntarily by authorities who removed chil-
dren from parents whose child rearing was seen as inadequate.54 Involuntary
indentures required local authorities to contract with families to care for the
removed children.55 These contracts were the first contracting to care for
children whose families were considered unable to properly raise them to
protect the community from the negative impact of these improperly raised
children. Throughout the eighteenth century, public authorities acted to
protect vulnerable children, such as orphans, emancipated slaves, unaccom-
panied laborers and contract laborers by binding them out to masters who
would provide acceptable supervision and training.
Because the family unit was considered a form of governance and social
control at the time, such involuntary indentures were not really public-
private contracting as we understand it today. These arrangements predated
a uniform child protection system, but they introduced interventions by the
state as parens patriae that would later be assumed by nineteenth century
criminal law prosecutions and anti-cruelty agency interventions. Historical
beliefs of appropriate child rearing triggered these early interventions. Such
early colonial arrangements are evidence of substitute care facilitated by
local authorities; the same is true with modern foster care.
From the earliest colonial days through the antebellum years, binding out
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. 1, supra note 46, at 64.
55. See id.
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remained the preferred way to deal with children of the poor. Although the
first orphanage was established in 1728 in New Orleans, specialized institu-
tional care for children was scarce until the nineteenth century. 6 Until that
time, children of the poor who could not be bound out to private families
were placed in almshouses, publicly operated warehouses for the poor not
segregated by age.5
7
2. Protection of Children from Abuse and Neglect
The middle of the nineteenth century brought cases of criminal prosecu-
tions against parents for beating their children. These prosecutions intro-
duced an era when the legal system began to intervene in family life and
compromise parental autonomy to protect children from physical assaults at
the hands of their parents. At this nascent stage of development of a legal
response to child abuse, many children considered "poor" or "neglected"
were already under public supervision. Now, the states began to prosecute
cases of physical assaults by parents on their children and to refer some of
those children to the community resources available for neglected children.
The early cases prosecuting parents for physical assaults illustrate the
historical hesitancy of the court to infringe on parental authority to protect
children on the basis of allegations of physical beatings by fathers. Such
56. See id. at 60-63.
57. In February 1775, of the 622 paupers on the books of the New York City
Almshouse, 259 were children, mostly under nine years of age. The authorities made
every effort to bind out even these young children. In 1788, laws were passed allowing
children in New York City, Albany and Hudson to be bound out without parental con-
sent. The mayor, recorder, or aldermen could approve such an arrangement for any
child found begging in the streets. By 1795, forty percent of the "inmates" at the alms-
house in New York City were children under nine years of age. In 1797, following a
yellow fever epidemic that filled the New York City almshouse with widows and their
children, a group of women founded the Ladies Society for the Relief of Poor Widows
with Small Children. The group was incorporated by law in 1802. In-kind help was
given to assist widows in making a livelihood, but no relief was granted to women who
refused to place out their children who were able to work. By 1800, the Society helped
152 widows with 420 children and in 1803 received state funding, raised by lottery, to
continue its work. In 1806, an orphanage was founded by the Society. At the time, it
was only the second such institution in the young country, the other being in Charles-
ton, South Carolina. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN
NEW YORK STATE 1609-1866, at 179-89 (1938). Amidst the development of institu-
tional care for children in the mid-19th century, the population of children in alms-
houses continued to grow. "The census of 1880 showed that 7,770 children between
the ages of two and sixteen were in almshouses in the United States .... " See Mason
P. Thomas Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part : Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 302 n.37 (1972) (citing HOMER FOLKS, THE
CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN 80 (1902)).
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intrusions would challenge the accepted paternal role and parenting pre-
rogatives. The texts reveal a range of legal questions posed by the courts in
attempting to redefine the limits of state intervention. Courts debated
whether it was the state of mind of the parent when perpetrating the beat-
ing,58 the instrument used in the beating,59 or the injury caused by the beat-
ing which should constitute evidence of abuse sufficient to sustain a prose-
cution.60 Courts searched for objective measures of actionable abuse to
avoid over-intrusion into family government. In one of a few early reported
cases, a permanent serious injury was necessary to prosecute to protect chil-
dren.
It will be observed that the test of the defendant's criminal liability is the in-
fliction of a punishment "cruel and excessive," and thus it is left to the jury
without the aid of any rule of law for their guidance to determine. It is quite
obvious that this would subject every exercise of parental authority in the
58. In Stanfield v. State, the court rejected the lower court charge, which fo-
cused on the instrument used in the beating, instead focusing on the manner of the
Defendant.
The charge asked and given does not mend the matter, which was that thejury could not convict the defendant unless the chastisement was done in a
cruel or vindictive manner .... Was the correction moderate? . .. If it was,
defendant was not guilty of an assault and battery at all .... If it was not
moderate, but excessive, he was guilty as charged of an aggravated assault
and battery by having exceeded the boundary of his legal right as guardian
under the law, and placed himself in the attitude of a stranger and not a par-
ent to the child .... Whether it is moderate or excessive must necessarily
depend upon the age, sex, condition and disposition of the child, with all
the attending and surrounding circumstances, to be judged of by the jury
43 Tex. 167, 168 (1875) (citations omitted). In Johnson v. State, similar reasoning was
used.
The right of parents to chastise their refractory and disobedient children is
so necessary to the government of families, to the good of society, that no
moralist or lawgiver has ever thought of interfering with its existence, or of
calling upon them to account for the manner of its exercise, upon light or
frivolous pretenses. But, at the same time, that the law has created and pre-
served this right, in its regard for the safety of the child it has prescribed
bounds beyond which it shall not be carried. In chastising a child, the par-
ent must be careful that he does not exceed the bounds of moderation and
inflict cruel and merciless punishment; if he do, he is a trespasser, and li-
able to be punished by indictment. It is not, then, the infliction of punish-
ment, but the excess, which constitutes the offence, and what this excess
shall be is not a conclusion of law, but a question of fact for the determina-
tion of the jury.
21 Tenn. 283, 283 (1840).
59. In Neal v. Georgia, 54 Ga. 281, 282 (1875), the court affirmed that one
"lick" with an old saw was "cruel and outrageous abuse of the parental authority, and
made the perpetrator of it guilty," while also noting that a "very large margin must be
left to the judgment of the parent." Id. at 283.
60. See State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 589 (1886).
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correction and discipline of children--in other words, domestic government--
to the supervision and control of jurors, who might, in a given case, deem
the punishment disproportionate to the offense, and unreasonable and exces-
sive. It seems to us, that such a rule would tend, if not to subvert family gov-
ernment, greatly to impair its efficiency, and remove restraints upon the
conduct of children .... The test, then, of criminal responsibility is the in-
fliction of permanent injury by means of the administered punishment, or
that it proceeded from malice, and was not in the exercise of a corrective
authority .... We do not propose to palliate or excuse the conduct of the de-
fendant in the present case. The punishment seems to have been needlessly
severe, but we refuse to take cognizance of it as a criminal act, because it
belongs to the domestic rather than legal power, to a domain into which the
penal law is reluctant to enter, unless induced by an imperious necessity.
6 1
These criminal prosecutions were contemporaneous with the more fa-
mous 1874 case of Mary Ellen.62 That case was championed in the front
pages of the New York Times. It was brought by leaders of the New York
Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals, heralding an era of child
rescue and protection by private philanthropic agencies. 63 The growing
work by such agencies developed the social and legal response to protect
children from the abusive actions of their parents by "rescuing" children
from them.
The Society leaders argued to the court on behalf of Mary Ellen, a young
girl whose care was at issue, that children, as members of the animal king-
dom, were entitled to protections at least equal to those provided animals.64
The arguments were fashioned by Henry Bergh, founder and president of
the Society, and Elbridge T. Gerry, counsel for the Society. The New York
Times article of April 10, 1874 opened:
It appears from proceedings had in Supreme Court yesterday, in the case of a
child named Mary Ellen, that Mr. Bergh does not confine the humane im-
pulses of his heart to smoothing the pathway of the brute creation toward the
grave or elsewhere, but that he embraces within the sphere of his kindly ef-
forts the human species also.65
61. Id. at 590-93.
62. See Lela B. Costin, Unraveling the Mary Ellen Legend: Origins of the
"Cruelty" Movement, 1992 Soc. SERVICES REV. 203 (1991).
63. For a summary discussion of earlier foundations of child protection in re-
sponse to child labor and orphans in colonial times and through the civil war, see NEIL
A. COHEN, Child Welfare History in the United States, in CHILD WELFARE: A
MULTICULTURAL Focus 13-21 (Neil A. Cohen ed., 1992). For a discussion of the emer-
gence of protection of children within the societies for the protection of cruelty to
animals before the Mary Ellen case, see Costin, supra note 62.
64. See Costin, supra note 62, at 204.
65. Mr. Bergh Enlarging His Sphere of Usefulness: Inhuman Treatment of a
Little Waif-Her Treatment-A Mystery to Be Cleared Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874, at
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The news articles explained that the child had been discovered when a
woman, Etta Angell Wheeler, was on an "errand of mercy" to a dying
woman. She was told by the woman of the desperate cries of a child in the
next tenement building. Wheeler had tried repeatedly to gain entrance to the
apartment to see the child. She was eventually let into the flat when Mr.
Connolly, the man of the house, was not present, and she was able to ob-
serve and have a short visit with Mary Connolly, his wife, and Mary Ellen.
While the news accounts of the time do not include commentary on domes-
tic violence, the circumstances of Wheeler's failed attempts and subsequent
entry, only when Mr. Connolly was absent, portray a scenario recognizable
today as comorbid domestic violence and child abuse. Perhaps Mr. Con-
nolly perpetrated some form of domestic violence against Mary Connolly
and was also abusive toward Mary Ellen; Mary Connolly was therefore
fearful of allowing Wheeler's entry in his presence. In another possible sce-
nario, perhaps Mr. Connolly was abusive toward his wife but Mary Con-
nolly was perpetrating the abuse against Mary Ellen either individually or
along with Mr. Connolly.
Reports indicate that Wheeler went to several institutions to seek help for
the child, before she found Bergh and pleaded for his assistance.66 It was
known at the first hearing that Mary Ellen was living with Mary and Francis
Connolly and they were charged with cruel abuse against her, but that they
were not her natural parents. 67 It is not clear how this casual custodianship
affected the willingness of the agency, court and public to champion prose-
cution of the Connollys.
The case was originally prosecuted against both Mr. and Mrs. Connolly.
Mary Ellen's ill health, lack of proper clothing and frequent abuse with
whips, scissors, and slaps must have been known, if not perpetrated, by both
adults in the home. Even if this could not be proven, it was only Mrs. Con-
nolly, on a day when Mr. Connolly was not present, who allowed Mrs.
Wheeler into the apartment to discuss Mary Ellen. Only Mrs. Connolly ever
appeared in court. Only she was ultimately tried and sentenced for the
8.
66. Perhaps because Mrs. Wheeler's husband was a newspaper man, the case is
graphically and fully reported in the paper. See Costin, supra note 62, at 210; N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1874, at 2; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1874, at 2; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1874, at 8; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1874, at 12. For a
compilation of related articles and papers of the New York Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children, see CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, Vol. II, 1866-1932 Parts 1-6, 185-97 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971) [herein-
after CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. II, Parts 1-6].
67. See The Mission of Humanity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1874, at 2; Costin,
supra note 62, at 207; CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. II, Parts 1-6, supra note 66, at 187.
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abuse.68 This celebrated abuse case targeted the "mother" caretaker. No
male was held accountable. The case signals the entry of private philan-
thropic agencies into the legal system on behalf of abused and neglected
children. It also foreshadows the treatment of mothers and lack of attention
paid to holding abusive fathers and husbands accountable before depend-
ency courts.69
This may be an infamous case of "failure to protect." Because he was de-
ceased, this case did not impinge on the rights of Mary Ellen's father. Mary
Ellen's mother's rights were not at issue in the prosecution because her
mother had abandoned her or had been separated from her much earlier.
Mary Connolly, taking on the custodianship of Mary Ellen as her step-
mother, may have been prosecuted because of this legal relationship. It is
also possible that she was prosecuted, despite her ultimate willingness to
allow Mrs. Wheeler into the flat against the wishes of her husband, because
she was the "mother" of the child and was therefore responsible for her care
under nineteenth century notions of parenting. Mr. Connolly's drunkenness,
violence against Mary Ellen and possible violence against Mrs. Connolly
were ignored, perhaps because he had no legal relationship to the child, or
perhaps because his behavior, as an unrelated "man in the house" was not as
shocking to the norms of child care at the time.
The publicity surrounding this case led to important results for the future
of child protection. The activities of private provider agencies acting on
behalf of abused and neglected children increased significantly. In the same
year, a private provider agency, the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, was formed with Elbridge Gerry as its counsel. 70 By
1880, thirty-three such societies existed in the United States,7' most of them
in the business of rescuing both animals and children. As Bergh explained:
The protection of children and the protection of animals are combined be-
68. See Mrs. Connolly, the Guardian, Found Guilty, and Sentenced to One
Year's Imprisonment at Hard Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1874, at 8.
69. See generally Marie Ashe, Postmodernism, Legal Ethics, and Representa-
tion of "Bad Mothers," in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 142-66 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin
eds., 1995); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist The-
ory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993); V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers:
State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1996); NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, FAILURE TO
PROTECT: A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR NEW YORK ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING BATTERED
WOMEN AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FAILURE TO PROTECT THEIR
CHILDREN FROM THE ABUSER (1993) [unpublished monograph].
70. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH, VOI. II Parts 1-6, supra note 66, at 189-97.
71. See Linda Gordon, Child Abuse, Gender and the Myth of Family Independ-
ence: Thoughts on the History of Family Violence and Its Social Control 1880-1920,
12 REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523 (1983-84).
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cause the principle involved, i.e., their helplessness, is the same; because all
life is the same, differing only in degree of development and expression; and
because each profits by association with the other.72
These early efforts were aimed at rescuing children and, sometimes,
prosecuting the adults who brutalized them. The societies did not see as
their mission any education or support of parents or treatment of families.
As Gerry explained:
The SPCC was simply created as a hand affixed to the arm of the law, by
which the body politic reaches out and enforces the law. The arm of the law
seizes the child when it is in an atmosphere of impurity, or in the care of
those who are not fit to be entrusted with it, wrenches the child out of these
surroundings, brings it to the court, and submits it to the decision of the
court--unless, on the other hand, it reaches out that arm of the law to the cru-
elist, seizes him within its grasp, brings him also to the criminal court and
insures his prosecution and punishment. These are the functions of our so-
cieties.
73
Until the mid-twentieth century, private philanthropic agencies inter-
vened on behalf of abused and neglected children. States made fledgling
criminal prosecution efforts on behalf of individual children but neither the
civil nor the criminal response was uniform or broadly applied. State crimi-
nal prosecutions for abuse continued without any federal legislative guid-
ance into the 1970' S.74 No federal law codified the duties of the state to
protect children from abuse and neglect.
72. See Costin, supra note 62, at 213.
73. ELBRIDGE GERRY, THIRTY FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
HUMANE ASSOCIATION (Albany, N.Y. 1907), cited in Costin, supra note 62, at 219. At
this 1907 speech at the Annual Meeting of the Society, Gerry was also clear that the
society's purpose was to rescue children and refer their parents for prosecution, not to
provide treatment. The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
(hereinafter "N.Y.S.P.C.C.") was "not created for the purpose of educating or reform-
ing children, or seeing that they were transported into other homes." Id. This descrip-
tion was meant in part to differentiate the purposes of the Society from the work of the
New York Children's Aid Society which gathered up children from the industrializing
Northeast cities and sent them on "orphan trains" to the rural Midwest where they were
given "proper homes" through an informal indenture. These rescue efforts are also
distinguishable from broader turn-of-the-century preventative efforts. Carl Carstens led
the first of these agencies, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children. In 1907, at that Society's Annual Meeting, Carstens stated the broader mis-
sion of child protection: "Children will still need to be rescued from degrading sur-
roundings for many years to come . . but the society recognizes more definitely that it
is a preventive agency." MASSACHUSETTS SOC. FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, 1907 ANN. REP. 27, in Paul Gerard Anderson, The Origin, Emergence, and
Professional Recognition of Child Protection, 63 SOC. SERVICES REV. 222, 224 (1989).
74. For a summary of the history of child protection and of the present opera-
tion of the system, see Mangold, supra note 6.
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A seminal event in the history of state intervention to protect children
from child abuse and neglect was the 1962 publication of Battered-Child
Syndrome by Dr. Henry Kempe.75 Kempe was a pediatrician who worked
with pediatricians and radiologists to identify causes of suspicious injuries
to children. 76 With new knowledge about injuries that could only be caused
by abusive behavior, states moved to codify responses to protect children.
Between 1963 and 1967, every state passed a statute requiring some form of
reporting of incidents of child abuse. Reporting triggers the state response
based on a child's right to protection from abuse and neglect.
In 1973, the Senate Subcommittee on Children and Youth of the Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings in Washington and at
children's hospitals around the country on the needs of abused and ne-
glected children.77 Bills were introduced in both the House and Senate, but
the Senate subcommittee chaired by Walter Mondale held the main hear-
ings. In a letter of transmittal to the Senate Committee Chairman, Mondale
explained the need for legislation:
The Subcommittee held hearings in Washington, New York, Denver and Los
Angeles. Members of the Subcommittee personally visited victims of child
abuse in hospitals and observed firsthand the operations of multi disciplinary
child abuse teams in several cities. We were appalled to learn how many
abused and neglected children there are and how little is being done to help
them and their troubled families. Statistics vary widely, but there is little
question that thousands and thousands of youngsters suffer severe physical
and emotional abuse every year. This is a problem that cuts across social and
economic barriers. It occurs in all kinds of neighborhoods. Yet there was no
focused Federal effort to deal with the problem. Nowhere in the Federal
government could we find one official assigned full time to the prevention,
identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect.78
One year later in 1974, The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA) was passed.79 CAPTA initiated a federal response to child abuse
based on a child's right to protection by the state where there is evidence of
parental harm. It formulated the mandates for the development of a bureauc-
racy within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now
75. See C. Henry Kempe et. al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N. 105 (July 7, 1962).
76. See C. Henry Kempe, Paediatric Implications of the Battered Baby Syn-
drome, 46 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 28, 28 (1971).
77. See Child Abuse Prevention Act, 1973: Hearings on S. 1191 Before the
Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d
Cong. 2 (1973) [hereinafter Mondale Hearings].
78. Id. at 2 (letter Walter Mondale sent to Hon. Harrison A. Williams).
79. One year later, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. 1995).
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called the Department of Health and Human Services) to gather information
and expertise on the problem of child abuse, a largely undocumented sub-
ject at the time.80
Most important for the subsequent history of the federal/state relation-
ship addressing child abuse, CAPTA contained provisions for a grant pro-
gram.81 Eligibility for grants required states to follow a series of mandates
in order to receive the funds.8 2 Those provisions concerned reporting, in-
vestigating, confidentiality of record keeping, and law enforcement coop-
eration. 3 They were the earliest versions of the more complete and com-
plicated federal-to-state reimbursement system which funds state child
protection systems today.
CAPTA established a minimum law enforcement-like state response to
determine which children had a plausible right to protection.84 By focusing
on reporting and investigating without attention to supporting families or
preventing abuse, parents as "alleged perpetrators" were pitted against the
agencies. Parental empowerment was in conflict with child protection. The
key state response to protect children from abuse became the mandatory
reporting, investigating, and record keeping system that is commonly
known as the child protective services system. While all states had some
form of reporting law in place before CAPTA, few met the more rigorous
CAPTA requirements before 1974. CAPTA, in effect, maintained con-
tinuing attention on reporting laws, confidentiality, and investigation.
CAPTA addressed the "front end" of the system, bringing attention to
troubled families and children and investigating them. It soon became
clear that permanency planning was crucial as children were being placed
in foster care in increasing numbers. Following the passage of CAPTA,
the numbers of children reported as abused and neglected exploded, and
state-based foster care systems were flooded with children placed as a
result of reporting and investigation through child protective services.
Senator Cranston summarized the situation before the Senate in 1979:
The number of children in foster care in 1977 was approximately 500,000,
nearly three times the number of children in foster care as compared to 1961.
In only one of every five cases does the services plan for these foster chil-
dren recommend a specific length of placement. In other words, the so-
called temporary provision of foster care has no definite target date for end-
ing the placement and for placing the child in a permanent family setting.
Over half the children in foster care have been away from their families for
80. See Mondale Hearings, supra note 77 (Letter of Transmittal).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See CAPTA, § 4(b)(3).
84. See id.
[Vol. 36:1
PROTECTION AND EMPOWERMENT
more than 2 years- about 100,000 children have spent more than 6 years of
their lives in foster care. Nearly one-fourth of the children have been in three
or more foster family homes. Even in cases where the agency had developed
a plan for returning the child to his or her home, in one-third of the cases,
there was no plan for visits between the child and the parent or another per-
son who would care for the child if returned home. There are more than
100,000 children in foster care awaiting adoption.8"
As reports mounted as a result of CAPTA requirements, foster care be-
came the expedient and perhaps sole resource to address the children's
safety. 6 Separation became the means of protection and protection was
divorced from caretaker empowerment.
3. Protection of Children by Empowerment of Parents
Concerns that children were being unnecessarily placed outside their
homes and were languishing without permanency in foster care led to pas-
sage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA). 7 Many of the children were neglected, not abused. For such
children, it was hoped that temporary supportive services would empower
parents to resume their authority and safely care for their children. For the
first time, empowerment became a preferred means of protection. The
AACWA imposed the mandate that states provide a plan to the federal gov-
ernment requiring the state-based public agency to make "reasonable ef-
forts" to prevent placement in foster care or achieve reunification for chil-
dren temporarily placed. 8 The law also provided for adoption subsidies to
encourage the adoption of children out of foster care who could not be re-
unified8 9 States codified the reasonable efforts and adoption language in
their laws.90 If states failed to meet the mandates of the law they would risk
losing eligibility for matching federal reimbursement for their foster care
expenses.91 As a consequence of the fiscal incentives offered in AACWA,
family preservation efforts to reunify families flourished and the number of
children in foster care began to decrease. 92 Unnecessary foster care place-
85. 125 CONG. REC. 110, 59 (1979) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
86. See id.
87. See Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. §§ 602, 608, 620-28, & 670-76 (1997)).
88. See id. at § 671(a)(15)(A (1994 & Supp. 1997).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
90. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366 (West 1999), MISS. CODE ANN. §
43-15-13 (1999).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
92. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN: 1994 YEARBOOK 22
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ment and foster care drift were diminished by requiring case planning, case
reviews, reunification efforts and subsidies for adoptions of children leaving
93foster care. The law required that whenever the determination to place a
child in foster care was pending, the court had to make a finding as to
whether "reasonable efforts" had been made to prevent the placement. It
was hoped that this procedural requirement could reduce the unnecessary
placement of children in foster care when services to their families could
maintain them safely at home.94 The goal was never to eliminate foster care.
There was and is a point on the spectrum of cases where separation is the
only means of protecting children. Instead, the law was targeted at the large
number of unnecessary placements of children who could remain safely at
home with supportive services.95 The provisions of the Social Security Act
codifying the AACWA have been revised over the past two decades to re-
quire a myriad of planning processes in exchange for federal reimbursement
for foster care.96 The state is required to have a written document for each
child in care which includes, in part,
[A] plan for assuring that the child receives safe and proper care and that
services are provided to the parents, child, and foster parents in order to im-
prove the conditions in the parents' home, facilitate return of the child to his
97
own safe home or the permanent placement of the child ....
The protection of the child includes not only state-provided services to
alleviate the risks of child abuse and neglect but also to reduce the risks of
unnecessary placement. In seeking to protect children from unnecessary
placement, the law made the right to protection and the empowerment of
families complimentary, not conflicting policies. The policy of protection
by empowerment of families was short lived and perhaps never fully exer-
cised. Preventive and supportive services were always "capped" services
and funding for them was never sufficient to meet the local need. In con-
trast, placement services were and are uncapped and available in unlimited
supply. These fiscal incentives and disincentives may have undermined
the spirit of AACWA.
Following passage of the AACWA, criticism began to mount over the
(1994).
93. See Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471(a)(15)(B), § 471(a)(16), § 473(a)(1), 94 Stat.
500, 503, 504 (1980) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 608, 620-28 and 670-
76(1997)).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
95. Richard Wexler makes a strong argument for family preservation, espe-
cially intensive family preservation services along the Homebuilders Model. Such
services are designed to prevent unnecessary placements. See Richard Wexler, Take
the Child and Run: Tales from the Age of ASFA, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 123 (2001).
96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-79b (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 675(l)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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perceived emphasis on empowering families. While the law had also pro-
vided for adoption subsidies to encourage and support the adoption of chil-
dren out of foster care, the emphasis on preservation and reunification was
criticized for fostering a climate where children were left in unsafe homes
and sometimes returned to unsafe homes. 9g The concern was that empow-
ering families was being mandated at the expense of the protection of chil-
dren. While the policy of the AACWA sought to empower families as the
best means of protecting children, criticism of the empowerment efforts
pitted family empowerment against the protection of children.
In the 1990's, the number of children in foster care began to increase
once again. While the reasons for this are complex, the increase is usually
attributed to the crack epidemic in the inner cities and the increasing per-
centage of children living in desperately poor conditions with young, un-
married mothers. 99 A series of highly publicized brutal deaths of children
who were "known to the public agency" and provided with failed preventive
services in their own homes instead of being placed in foster care led to a
growing outcry for reform of the system. 00
4. Retreating from Protection by Empowerment of Parents with a
New Emphasis on Termination of Parental Rights
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)'0 l was a partial re-
sponse to renewed calls for protection - both for swifter removal from abu-
sive homes and for expedited adoptions. Protection was again viewed as it
had been before the AACWA - as requiring swifter removal from investi-
gated homes instead of supportive services into the homes. ASFA provides
exceptions to the reasonable efforts requirement introduced in the AACWA
when "aggravated circumstances" are present. 0 2 The section providing for
the exceptions appears uncontroversial at first glance, citing torture, death
of another child, or sexual abuse as examples; but a more broad exception
comes from the "aggravated circumstances" catch-all provision which is left
to the states to define. 0 3 It moves the balance from empowering parents
98. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD ABUSE, FINAL REPORT
(1996).
99. See id. at 22-25.
100. See id. at 3-4, 28-29. For a discussion of the perceived problems with the
reasonable efforts requirement leading to the adoption of the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act, see Christine H. Kim, Putting Reasonable Back into the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287 (1999).
101. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 671-679b (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
103. See id. In his article in this volume, Richard Wexler describes the impact
of ASFA in very stark terms. See Wexler, supra note 95. While I see ASFA as a par-
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toward a stronger child's right to protection. It does not abandon protection
by empowerment, but has shifted the policy focus toward protection by re-
moval.
ASFA was passed to clarify that the health and safety of the child should
always be paramount and to detail circumstances under which reasonable
efforts did not have to be pursued. ASFA retreats from the goal of reunifi-
cation in certain cases where "aggravated circumstances" or felony convic-
tions exist. In a shift away from reunification and toward adoption the law
also required that child welfare agencies file a petition to terminate parental
rights for children in care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months.'0 4 This
sets an end limit on protection by empowerment. In the earlier House ver-
sion, the law expedited termination proceedings only for children under the
age of ten.105 While the law ultimately passed did not include this maximum
age requirement, the sentiment of the Congress throughout the debate was
that the bill would mainly impact adoptions for this preteen population. The
final law includes additional important provisions for older children, namely
allowing states to designate them as "special needs" children due to age and
making them eligible for adoption assistance by providing them with con-
tinuing health insurance.
10 6
In 1997, with the passage of ASFA, Congress altered the federal man-
dates on states providing foster care services to abused and neglected chil-
dren. 107 The new mandates shifted the focus from preservation and reunifi-
cation toward a new emphasis on swifter termination. Whether this was a
balanced adjustment of protection and empowerment from the
empowerment-driven AACWA or a hard swing toward protection that will
later be re-balanced is yet unclear.
In 1999, Congress again amended the law governing these placements by
focusing on the needs of older children in out-of-home care and passing the
tial retreat from the philosophy of family preservation, I would not go so far as him in
characterizing this as the age of "take the child and run." See id. If no ASFA excep-
tion applies, child welfare agencies are still required to make reasonable efforts to
prevent placements and reunify children. See id.
104. For an article critical of this shift in emphasis, see Naomi R. Cahn, Chil-
dren's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1189 (1999).
105. See Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, § 3(a)(3)(E) (reported favorably out
by the Committee of Ways and Means).
106. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115, § 306 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997)). See 143
CONG. REC. S12, 513-26 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee empha-
sizing importance of the medical care adoption subsidy for teens adopted out of care).
107. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-679b (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
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Foster Care Independence Act (FCIA). 08 FCIA and ASFA represent a
change in philosophy from the previous law, moving from protection by
supported family preservation or reunification toward protection by alterna-
tive placements - adoption or independent living arrangements. FCIA was
passed to enhance services for children aging out of foster care with the goal
of "independent living." In a sense, this law was necessary because of the
failure of all previous efforts to find and support families for children in
foster care. It made possible a continuing claim to the entitlement of foster
care based upon a right to protection until age twenty-one even for older
teens who had reached the age of eighteen. This law is an important step in
recognizing the role of child empowerment in protecting children, but as is
discussed infra Part III, it does not go far enough to continue protecting
while empowering older foster children.
D. Protection and Empowerment in the Operation of the Current
Foster Care System
The fundamental rights of parents can be disturbed and the child's right
to protection triggered by allegations of abuse or neglect. As discussed
supra Part I.C.3, all states have in place a child protection system which
responds to such allegations by investigating families and temporarily
removing children when it is deemed necessary for their safety. 1°9
Sometimes parents voluntarily place their children outside the home during
the course of the investigation and sometimes a court mandates the
placement." 0 When placed, these children enter a system of out-of-home
care which can include non-relative foster family homes, foster homes
provided by relatives called kinship homes, group homes or larger
residential settings. Once placed in out-of-home care by the child protection
system through the voluntary or involuntary temporary surrender of parents,
these children become foster children."' Foster care is always meant to be
temporary. A permanency plan is written for every child in care with a
recognized goal (reunification, adoption, independent living) and a set of
action steps to achieve that goal.
The child protective services system is triggered by a report of abuse or
neglect as defined in state law under the requirements of CAPTA. Reports
are made by voluntary or mandated reporters to hotlines that federal law
requires every state to operate.' 2 Voluntary reports can be made by
neighbors, friends, family members - anyone who suspects child abuse or
neglect on the part of a caretaker.' 3 If the reporter provides adequate
information to the hotline operator, the report triggers investigation by the
108. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822
(1999).
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local child protection agency. 1 4 Private individuals are vitally involved in
activating the child protective services system through reporting, but
hotlines are maintained and initial investigations are done by the public
agency.
Mandated reporters are crucial to the child protective services system.
Through mandated reporting, the parens patriae power of the state is
exercised to conscript professionals who work with children to become
partial state agents in protecting children from harm. These reporters
generally are persons who work in professions or roles that bring them into
contact with children. 15 If these professionals suspect or believe that
children with whom they come into contact in the course of their
employment are suffering from abuse or neglect, confidentiality and
privilege are forfeited and the professionals are mandated to report the
abuse or neglect to the state operated child protection system. Some states
require that professionals who work with parents and have reason to suspect
abuse are also mandated to report. 1 6 These professionals are not merely
invited to participate on behalf of children; they are required to do so
regardless of their professional opinion as to the wisdom, value, or safety of
reporting." 7
In effect, the state forces professionals to participate and invites the
non-professional community member, the modem day Etta Angel
Wheeler, to make reports voluntarily. This reporting system is not a novel
109. The state child protection systems operate under federal mandates codified
in the Social Security Act since the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-119c
(1995 & Supp. 2000)).
110. A voluntary placement agreement with the parent or legal guardian or a
court adjudication is necessary for federal reimbursement for the placement under 42
U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (Supp. 1998).
11I. This article focuses on out-of-home care provided through the child protec-
tion system and not as a result of delinquency, mental illness or status offenses which
result in placement outside the child welfare system. For a discussion of foster care in
the delinquency system, see also Burt Galaway et al., Specialist Foster Family Care
for Delinquent Youth, 59 FED. PROBATION 19 (1995). For a discussion of privatization
of care in these systems, see Mangold, supra note 3 at 1300, n. 14.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(l)(A) (1995 & Supp. 2000).
113. Abuse by a non-caretaker can only be pursued criminally. The civil system
is reserved for intra-familial violence.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1995 & Supp. 2000). For examples of state
operational directives, see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(a) (McKinney 1992); Boland
v. State, 638 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1996).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (1995 & Supp. 2000).
116. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1992).
117. See generally MURRAY LEVINE & HOWARD J. DOUECK, THE IMPACT OF
MANDATED REPORTING ON THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS PICKING UP THE PIECES (1995).
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creation of the 1960's; rather, it was an evolving codification of the child
protection system developed since colonial times and expanded by private
philanthropic agencies and criminal prosecutions at the turn of the
century. In 1997, approximately three million children were reported
abused or neglected." Depending on the severity of the allegations, child
protective services workers must respond within the period of time
required by state law to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
support the allegations. 119 If the workers find that there is not sufficient
evidence, the reports are considered "unfounded" and the cases are
closed. 120 Of the three million reports in 1997, investigation by agencies
confirmed that abuse or neglect had occurred in just under one million
cases.121 In other words, each year, over two million cases are investigated
but no further action is deemed necessary. 22 Among substantiated reports,
data shows that African American children are over-represented; African
American children comprise fifteen percent of the population, but make up
twenty-eight percent of the children with substantiated reports.' 23 Neglect
is the allegation substantiated for most children in the dependency system.
In 1995, forty-two percent of the substantiated cases were classified as
neglect while only twenty-two percent were classified as abuse. Sexual
abuse was the confirmed allegation in eleven percent of the cases. 124 If a
public agency worker confirms a report, often referred to as "indicating"
or "substantiating" the report, the agency decides what further action is
necessary. In many cases, the perpetrator is removed from the home by the
time the investigation is completed, so no further services or supervision
is required. In other instances, the family may be given the option of
"voluntarily accepting services" from the agency, services that are often
delivered by a private provider agency as a subcontractor to the public
agency. These services may range from parenting classes and periodic
visits to the home to out-of-home placement of the child. By federal law,
the agency must make reasonable efforts to keep the family together
unless an exception under ASFA applies. If services are not available to
keep the child safely at home despite reasonable efforts to provide such
118. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, supra note 13.
119. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6) (McKinney 1992).
120. See id. § 424(7).
121. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, supra note 13, at 85; MICHAEL R. PETIT ET AL.,
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A LOOK AT THE STATES, 3 (1997).
122. In New York, as a result of the death of Eliza Izquierdo, the law was
amended to keep records of unsubstantiated reports for use in future investigations.
The law is known as "Eliza's Law." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(5) (McKinney 1992).
123. See PETIT supra note 121, at 19.
124. See id. at 30.
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services, the child may be removed. 125 Data compiled from thirty-five
states shows that 130,685 children were removed due to abuse and neglect
in 1995.126 As of March 1999, there were a record 547,000 children in out-
of-home placements as a result of removal due to allegations of abuse and
neglect.'
27
Once a child is removed to out-of-home placement, the case must be
reviewed periodically by the court or by administrative review.' 28 If the
family refuses voluntary services in the home or refuses to voluntarily
place the child, the public agency may petition the court to find that the
child is abused or neglected and to mandate a disposition. 129 The
disposition can include services in the child's home and/or out-of-home
placement for the child.130 A system of procedural requirements comes
into play to provide periodic dependency hearings on the parents'
rehabilitation, the agency's efforts, and the child's safety. 131 The judge in
such proceedings rarely considers the arguably important issues of child
support, joint custody, or domestic violence 132 in formulating mandatory
orders, but advocates against domestic violence are increasingly
encouraging such considerations. 133 The ultimate protective tool of the
system is removal of the children from the home. Increasingly under the
provisions of ASFA, this can lead to termination of parental rights and an
order that frees a child for adoption.
E. Empowerment vs. Protection in the Debate Over the Proper Role of
the Attorney for the Child
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) and (D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
126. See PETIT, supra note 121, at 38.
127. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, supra note 13, at 84, 86.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (Supp. 1998).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (Supp. 1998).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1998).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (1994).
132. While inquiries into violence against the mother in the home may be part of
a risk assessment at the outset of a case, the focus is on the children. If the violence
threatens the children, the children can be removed. A referral may be given to the
mother to tell her how to remove the perpetrator through the domestic violence system
and her swiftness and success in doing so may determine how she is judged as a parent.
She will also be given a variety of tasks to work toward reunification with her child.
Often, she is required to maintain a stable home and income. This may make it difficult
for her to remove a batterer who is the family's source of income. See generally NAT'L
CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 69.
133. Without such comprehensive orders, conflicting orders regarding custody
and visitation arrangements can jeopardize the safety of mothers and children. See
NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC
AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994).
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The shifting balance between protection and empowerment is evident in
the history, laws and current operation of the child protection system and
the foster care system as discussed supra Part I.B-D. As a theoretical
debate, it is still being waged among scholars studying the child protection
system when considering the proper role of the attorney for the child.The
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ties delivery of federal
matching funds to the requirement that a guardian ad litem be appointed
for children in all dependency court proceedings.' 34  Regulations
promulgated to interpret this provision of CAPTA state that the guardian
ad litem must "represent and protect the rights and best interests of the
child.' 35 The ambiguity in this terminology has left open to interpretation
whether attorneys must be appointed to represent children or if others,
professionals or volunteers, can take on this role. 136 Even when an
attorney is appointed, as is required in many states, the role of that
attorney in the proceedings is unclear. Must the lawyer operate in a
traditional lawyer-client relationship to fully protect and exercise their
child client's rights (empowerment model) or can the lawyer generally, or
at least in some instances, represent some notion of the child's best
interest (protection model)? 137
Scholarship and commentary on the appropriate model of representation
of children in dependency proceedings collectively assumes one of these
two positions. 138 The empowerment model posits that children should be
treated as autonomous clients and their positions should be zealously
represented before the court. This is sometimes called the "autonomy" or
134. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (1995 & Supp. 2000).
135.45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (1998).
136. For a discussion of the advantages of employing social workers and others
who are specifically trained to work with children, especially young children, see
Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the Attorney-
Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955 (1996).
137. This ambiguity exists in law and in practice. For a more detailed discussion
of the openness to interpretation of the advocates' role, see Emily Buss, "You're My
What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1996); Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Repre-
sentation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What
Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341 (1987); Sarah
Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of
Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287 (1983).
138. There is general agreement that children in delinquency proceedings should
be represented as autonomous clients. This consensus flows from a reading of In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which focuses on protection of a child's procedural due
process rights when a child's liberty is at stake. In dependency cases, where a child's
placement is at issue, the right to an attorney should be interpreted as in In re Gault.
In custody cases, the role of counsel is often debated as it is in dependency proceed-
ings. See Buss, supra note 137, at 1700-01 n.3.
20011
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
"expressed interest" view. The protection model advocates that children,
as not fully competent clients, need to be protected and a position of their
"best interest," whether or not it coincides with their expressed interest,
should be advanced. 139 Proponents of the autonomy or empowerment
model advocate that children should be carefully interviewed, and their
attorneys should put the child's expressed interests before the court. This
view, prevalent in legal literature, 140 states that a lawyer's professional
role dictates such advocacy on behalf of the client and that any other
model which allows for the opinion of the lawyer to be presented to the
court is not legitimate.' 4'
There are many commentators who state their preference for an empow-
ering model of representation but import a variety of caveats. Some argue
that a lawyer should be excused from following her client's wishes when
the client is too young, the matter is too important, or the proceeding is too
chaotic to assure that all proper information will be before the court.142 Usu-
ally these concerns are most keen when the issue before the court is whether
a child should be returned to her parents. The concern is that young, impres-
sionable children will wish to return to their parents against their own best
interest. Some commentators suggest that when these concerns are present
in a case, the child's attorney should assert her own opinion about what is in
the child's "best interest.' ' 143 Others argue that the lawyer should act as an
investigator and objectively ensure that all information is in evidence before
the court so that a judge can properly decide what is in the child's best in-
terest.144 At least one commentator urges that lawyers for young children
139. See generally, Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996) (hereinafter "Confer-
ence Proceedings"). Articles in this special issue deal specifically with the different
models. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Coun-
sel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and
Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective
Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1505 (1996); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics
of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the
Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996).
140. See generally, Conference Proceedings, supra note 140; American Bar
Association Standards of Practice For Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and
Neglect Cases, 14 CHILD. RTS. CHRON. 25, 25-26 (1995-96).
141. See Federle, supra note 139, at 1655.
142. See Ramsey, supra note 137 at 287.
143. See Peters, supra note 139; Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver:
Child Client's Competence in Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1473-78 (1996).
144. See Martin Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented But Not Heard:
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984) (dis-
cussing the various attorney roles, including the role of investigator).
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follow the dictates of the underlying substantive law.
14
The first caveat, that capacity must be considered before a child can be
represented as an autonomous client, is the most prevalent in scholarly legal
literature. It has led to a debate over the proper age at which capacity can be
presumed, 146 who should determine capacity, 147 and the attempts a lawyer
can make to discern a sense of the child's wishes even when the child is
considered impaired.
148
The second caveat, that a child's lawyer can be excused from the tradi-
tional lawyer role when the stakes are too high for the child's safety, usually
imagines a situation where placement or reunification is before the court
and the child is urging a position which would place her with her parents.
149
This occurs at the dispositional or dispositional review stage of proceedings.
In the chaotic, crisis driven dependency system, the concern is also raised
that the adversarial system cannot be presumed to act properly. Critics sug-
gest that not all of the information will be brought out by the overburdened
child welfare agency, and the child's position, if prepared in a thorough and
aggressive manner, will be given undue weight. Even if both the parental
representatives and the public agency prepare fully, the child's attorney can
be seen as a third party whose decision lends determinative weight to the
position of one or the other party. This can be problematic when the child's
attorney follows her client's wishes instead of her own opinion about what
is in the child's best interest, and the other parties do not fully develop the
facts and present dangers which lead the attorney to reach that opinion.
Other commentators see the role of a child advocate, even an appointed
attorney, allowing representation of a child's best interest regardless of the
child's expressed interest. 150 Under the best interest approach, possible in-
competence, underlying substantive law, and the nature of the proceedings
are persuasive in releasing the lawyer from her traditional role and taking a
subjective "best interest" approach.
145. See id. Guggenheim advocates a traditional lawyer-client relationship for
unimpaired children in any legal context. For impaired children, the underlying sub-
stantive law should inform the lawyer's representation.
146. See Ramsey, supra note 137, at 312 (suggesting a presumptive age of
seven).
147. See Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Repre-
sentation of Children: Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Ca-
pacity to Make Decisions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (1996).
148. See Margulies, supra note 143, at 1473.
149. See Ramsey, supra note 137, at 309-20 (suggesting that a determination of
capacity can be tied to the risk presented by the position: if the risk is high, a higher
degree of capacity can be required before the lawyer must be bound by the client's
position. Ramsey acknowledges the subjectivity inherent in this position).
150. See Peters, supra note 139 (discussing the best interest model).
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The law governing child protection in abuse and neglect proceedings is
unclear in establishing a preference for empowerment or protection even in
the exercise of the basic right to counsel. This tension is even present for
older children who have the strongest claim on empowerment rights and
clearest capacity to inform their attorney of their wishes. For such children,
empowering them is the key to protecting them as foster children and when
they leave foster care. They should be the source of information and guid-
ance both to their attorneys and to the agency workers planning their pro-
tective care.
PART II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CHILD PROTECTION AND THE
TENSION BETWEEN EMPOWERMENT AND PROTECTION
A. Balancing Empowerment and Protection of Women - History of the
Legal Response to Domestic Violence
The legal response to domestic violence in the United States must begin
with an understanding that beating one's wife, like beating one's child, was
not only ignored but was condoned by law. The famous "rule of thumb"
was part of an accepted Law of Chastisement in English Common Law
which allowed wife beating by a husband to keep his wife from acting in
unacceptable or illegal ways at a time when the husband and wife were
considered one person (the man) and he would be liable for her offenses. In
early Colonial times, the Bodie of Liberties prohibited wife assault of any
form in Massachusetts in an effort to create civility and order in the New
World; but, there is no evidence that this, or its accompanying proscription
against unnaturally severe corporal punishment of children, were ever
strictly enforced.151 Until the mid-1800's criminal prosecutions, discussed
supra Part I.C.2, of child abuse by fathers did not trigger state intervention.
Similarly, an acceptance of at least moderate chastisement of wives was
prevalent, either under the guise that beatings were within the husband's
prerogative or that, even if beyond his reasonable prerogative, legal
151. The Bodie of Liberties of 1641 states, "Number 80. Everie marryed woe-
man shall be free from bodilie correction or stripes by her husband, unlesse it be in his
owne defence upon her assalt." and "Number 83. If any parents shall wilfullie and
unreasonably deny any childe timely or convenient mariage, or shall exercise any un-
naturall severitie towards them, such childeren shall have free libertie to complaine to
Authoritie for redresse." Bodie of Liberties of 1641 as contained in The Colonial Laws
of Massachusetts (reprinted from the Edition of 1672 with the Supplements through
1686) at 51. For a discussion of this early effort, see PLECK, supra note 47 at 4. A
second attempt to address domestic violence was made in the progressive era, but was
not sustained. See id.; see also LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIVES: THE
POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988).
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intervention would improperly intervene into the private domestic sphere.
In 1824, in the oft-quoted case of Bradley v. State, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi ruled that:
Family broils and dissentions cannot be investigated before the tribunals of
the country, without casting a shade over the character of those who are un-
fortunately engaged in the controversy. To screen from public reproach
those who may be thus unhappily situated, let the husband be permitted to
exercise the right of moderate chastisement, in cases of great emergency,
and use salutary restraints in every case of misbehaviour, without being
subjected to vexatious prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and
shame of all parties concerned.152
It was not until the late 1960's, as part of the feminist movement
sweeping the country, that efforts to change attitudes about domestic vio-
lence and to protect women from its harms began and grew. 5 3 Until this
time, there was no legal response to the systemic problem of domestic
violence in the United States.5 4 Unlike the concurrent response to child
abuse which was developed in each state by law in the 1960's and then by
federal legislation in 1974, the initial activity to reform the response to
domestic violence was a grass-roots, private effort. Perhaps due to distrust
of government prevalent at the time, and to the broader understanding of
domestic violence as a form of gender subordination among feminist lead-
ers,155 the movement was carried on outside of government with the es-
tablishment of shelters, public education and support groups for women.1
5 6
These grass-roots interventions were premised on the idea that women
could be protected by empowering them - the theories of protection and
empowerment were not at odds but were instead complimentary.
One of the first battered women's shelter, Chiswick Women's Aid, was
started in England in 1971. United States activists visited the shelter, and
subsequently, in the 1970's, shelters began opening in the United States.
State legislation providing for civil and criminal remedies followed. Dur-
ing the 1970's and 80's, legal advances were hindered by lingering preju-
dices amongst judges, prosecutors and police which often frustrated the
152. Bradley v. State, I Miss. 156 (1 Walker) (Miss. 1824).
153. There were earlier efforts to address family violence but these were not
sustained and did not result in legal responses. See PLECK, supra note 47, at 4.
154. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND
THE LAW 1 (2001).
155. See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS
AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982).
156. See Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State's Response to Domestic Vio-
lence: Past Victories and Future Challenges, I GEO. J. GENDER & L. 127, 128 (1999).
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efforts of women to free themselves from abusive relationships.
While the federal government enacted CAPTA in 1974, it took another
twenty years before major federal law addressing domestic violence was
passed in 1994. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), part
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,5 created
federal enforcement mechanisms to augment state laws. Interstate domestic
violence 158 and interstate stalking 159 became federal offenses along with
interstate violation of state protection orders. 160 A host of firearm offenses
were also made subject to federal jurisdiction.' 61 States are now required to
give full faith and credit to protective orders from other states.
62
VAWA also included a civil rights provision, declaring by federal law
that crimes of violence motivated by gender violated a victim's civil rights.
The provision provided relief in the form of compensatory damages, puni-
tive damages, and injunctive relief.163 The civil rights provision was de-
clared unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison.164 The other provisions
of VAWA are still in effect and give relief for interstate as well as gun-
related violence.
B. Current Domestic Violence System and Coordination with the
Child Protection System
1. Statistics
Currently, the institutional responses to family violence are bifurcated
between two systems: the child protective services system and the domestic
violence system. Each of these systems is premised on a clearly identified
victim: the innocent child in need of protection in the child protective serv-
ices system and the battered wife in the domestic violence system. For
those families who do not neatly fit into-the paradigm of single victim im-
age of one system, access to legal or social service assistance to escape the
violence is complicated, sometimes complimentary but often contradictory.
Increasingly, there is recognition that family violence does not fit neatly
into these two categories and that different forms of family violence occur
157. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat., 1796 (codified as amended in 1996, 18
U.S.C. § 2261).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Supp. V 2000).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
164. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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concurrently and need to be addressed simultaneously. Because of the high
comorbidity between domestic violence and child abuse, there is a fledgling
effort to coordinate institutional responses to violence against women and
children. 165 Tragically, this coordination has resulted in new system-
imposed harms to the women and children it seeks to protect. 166 In the case
study of Rosa, her mother sought non-legal assistance in the form of shelter
to escape her abusive husband. Ten months later, the child welfare agency
removed Rosa from her mother's care and placed her in foster care. The
allegations prompting the removal were based on Rosa witnessing verbal
abuse in her home. By her mother reaching out for support to protect herself
and Rosa, she was pitted against the child protection agency. We are not
told Rosa's age or wishes in this case. Assuming she is either too young to
articulate a preference or wants to be with her mother, there is no evidence
that empowerment of her mother and protection of Rosa could not be com-
plimentary instead of contradictory goals.
Studies to date have begun to illuminate the interrelationships between
different forms of family violence. 167 Feminists must play an integral part in
165. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MODEL
CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
LEGAL IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN (1994).
166. For a discussion of early recognition of this problem, see NAT'L CENTER ON
WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 69 (including position paper, Grossier-Keller,
Battered Women and Their Battered Children: Criminal and Civil Allegations of the
Women's Failure to Protect).
167. See Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between. Wife Beating and
Child Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 158 (Kersti Y116 & Michele
Bograd ed. 1988). As late as 1988, Bowker, Arbitell and McFerron wrote that empiri-
cal data illuminating possible links between forms of family violence was sparse, but
we held assumptions that the links exist. The authors review the scant literature on the
correlation between child abuse and wife abuse. In their own study, the authors find
that child abuse accompanied wife abuse in seventy percent of the studied cases where
children were in the home. See id. at 162.
In A Guide to Research on Family Violence, the Urban Institute and National
Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges reports that, "[tihe risk of child abuse is
significantly higher when partner assault is also reported." THE URBAN INSTITUTE AND
THE NATIONAL CENTER ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, A GUIDE TO
RESEARCH ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 27 (1993) (citing Gerald T. Hotaling et al., Intrafa-
mily Violence and Crime and Violence Outside the Family, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 315
(Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry ed. 1989)). After this generally accepted statement, the
studies vary greatly in their numbers, but all show a high correlation between partner
assault and child abuse. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY
BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS (Harper & Row 1989) (nearly
half of men who abuse their female partners also abuse their children); MURRAY A.
STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (Anchor
Books 1980) (nationally, seventy-five percent of battered women say that their chil-
dren are also battered); Jean Giles-Sims, A Longitudinal Study of Battered Wives, 34
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gathering the statistics of family violence to ensure an accurate representa-
tion of the experiences of women and children 168 in households where vio-
lence is present.
169
Existing statistics detailing the violence within families are overwhelm-
ing. Between two million and four million women are victims of family
violence annually. 170 Violence among adult intimate partners, often called,
"domestic violence," is almost exclusively perpetrated by men against
women. In the National Crime Survey, ninety-one percent of spousal as-
saults were by men against their wives or ex-wives.
171
FAM. REL. 205 (1985) (one-third of families reporting a violent incident between the
parents also reported the presence of child abuse).
168. In 1991, the National Commission on Children wrote,
[A] recent analysis of the factors that place children at risk of maltreatment
suggest that only family income is consistently related to all categories of
abuse and neglect. When other factors, such as single parenthood and race,
are controlled for income, there is no positive correlation with heightened
risk of abuse and neglect. In fact, this analysis suggests that when the same
resources are available to families headed by single mothers as to two-
parent households, children are actually at lower risk of maltreatment.
NAT'L COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC, A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN
284 (1991) (citing Andrea Sedlak, National Prevalence of Child Abuse and Neglect,
paper presented for the Conference on Child Welfare Reform Experiments, American
Expertise Institute, Washington, D.C. (1991)).
169. Katharine Bartlett describes the importance of "asking the woman ques-
tion," in describing feminist legal methods. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990). Given the overwhelming overrepresentation
of women as victims of domestic violence, gathering statistics with a woman's per-
spective is crucial. For instance, evaluation of success in the domestic violence system
often focuses on whether or not a woman complainant appears for all proceedings.
Prosecution achieving a guilty finding or plea is the ultimate goal. In changing the
terms of the debate, feminists need to collect data on whether women who access the
system believe the system has been successful for them even if they chose not to par-
ticipate in the full formal legal process. See generally, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK AT BUFFALO SCHOOL OF LAW FAMILY VIOLENCE CLINIC, MONROE COUNTY
FAMILY COURT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTENSIVE INTERVENTION COURT EVALUATION
(2000) (evaluation included in person interviews with 143 women seeking protective
orders and follow up contacts three months later). As aptly put by Colleen McGrath of
the New York State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, "A DA's witness
who failed to show up may in fact be a savvy consumer of the system." Interview with
Colleen McGrath, New York State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, in
Albany, N.Y. (Nov. 21, 1994).
170. See Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health
Service, 23 JAMA 267 (June 17, 1992).
171. See Patsy Klaus & Michael Rand, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FAMILY VIOLENCE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (April 1984).
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It is commonly estimated that the co-morbidity of domestic abuse and
child abuse is 30% to 60%.172 In one survey of battered women, 87% of the
women who lived with children reported that the children knew about the
battering. 173 Living within a dynamic of violence makes the children indi-
rect victims. Often, the children are the direct targets of the violence. Re-
searchers estimate that there are 810,000 families in the U.S. where there is
concurrent spouse abuse and child abuse.174 It is also estimated that 3.3 mil-
lion to 10 million children witness domestic violence annually.1
7 1
2. Practice
Once a child is removed, or if the family refuses voluntary services, a
system of procedural requirements comes into play to provide periodic
hearings on the parent's rehabilitation, the agency's efforts and the child's
safety. The judge in a child protective services case rarely considers issues
of child support, joint custody or adult violence in formulating orders. The
ultimate "protective" tool of the child protective service system is removal
of the children from the home. In extreme cases, this can lead to termination
of parental rights, an act which frees a child for adoption.
While inquiries into violence against the mother in the home may be part
of a risk assessment at the outset of a case, it is not the job of the child pro-
tective services system to protect the adults in the home. If violence threat-
ens children, the child protective services system has within its power to
remove the children, and will not usually take steps to remove the perpetra-
tor. At best, a referral may be given to the mother to tell her how to remove
the perpetrator through the domestic violence system.' 76 Her swiftness and
172. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, supra note 13 at 86 (citing Jeffrey L. Edelson, The
Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 134-54 (Feb. 1999)).
173. Lenore Walker reported results from a sample of battered women asked
about concurrent child abuse. Fifty-three percent (53%) of the women reported that
the batterer abused the children. Twenty-eight percent (28%) reported that they them-
selves abused the children. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
188 (1984).
174. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY
VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE iii (1990) (citing MARIA Roy, CHILDREN IN
THE CROSSFIRE: VIOLENCE IN THE HOME-How DOES IT AFFECT OUR CHILDREN?
(1988)).
175. See CHILD. DEF. FUND, supra note 13, at 86.
176. Removal via divorce or separation carries pitfalls. The Model Code on
Family Violence recommends a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest
of a child to award sole, joint legal or joint physical custody to a perpetrator of domes-
2001]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
success in doing so may determine how she is judged as a parent. She will
probably also be given a variety of tasks to work toward family reunifica-
tion. Often, she is required to maintain a stable home and income. This may
make it difficult for her to remove a batterer who is the family's source of
income from the home.177 The domestic violence system is usually triggered
by an adult victim who seeks the assistance of the police or the courts to
stop an act or acts of violence against her. If she alleges sufficient facts, she
can receive a civil or criminal protective order from the court to order him
to cease the abuse and perhaps to keep him away from her for the period of
time detailed in the order. A criminal order requires the arrest of the alleged
perpetrator. Most states also have procedures in place to allow her to peti-
tion for attorney's fees, temporary support, and child custody on a short
term emergency basis, but such orders are not always easy to receive, espe-
cially when there are existing orders from the domestic relations branch of
the court.
Even in localities where police are mandated to make an arrest when
there exists probable cause that an act of violence has occurred, release is
almost immediate. Maintenance of a violence-free home depends on the
woman's ability to enforce the protective order and on the ability and will-
ingness of law enforcement to respond to violations and hold the perpetrator
accountable to the terms of the order.
Because of statistics drawing parallels between violence against women
and children, efforts to coordinate the responses between the two systems
which respond to each form of violence have begun. Tragically, the results
of this attempted coordination have frequently been to blame the woman
victim of domestic violence for failing to protect her children from the vio-
lence. Instead of illuminating the dynamic of violence, stopping the perpe-
tic violence. The Model Code also recommends that visitation by a parent who com-
mitted domestic violence only be permitted if the safety of the child and parent victim
can be protected with a list of suggested safeguards. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE
AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: MODEL STATE CODE 33, 34 (1994).
The "friendly parent" doctrine in child custody cases also has the unintended conse-
quence of rewarding the abuser and frustrating the mother's efforts to separate herself
from a batterer. Under that doctrine, the parent most likely to facilitate the relationship
between the child and the other parent is given custody. In a domestic violence situa-
tion, the woman's arguments to decrease a batterer's access to herself and their child
may work against her and give him custody. See e.g., Karen Czapansky, Domestic
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender
Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L. Q. 247, 256 (1993).
177. Many of the interviewed women at the State University of New York at
Buffalo School of Law's Family Violence Clinic discussed the financial difficulties
which caused them to stay with the batterer, or suffer financial hardship after ending
the relationship. See STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO SCHOOL OF LAW
FAMILY VIOLENCE CLINIC, supra note 169, at 35.
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trator from committing violent acts, and supporting the child's non-
offending caregiver, the coordination efforts have only made law enforce-
ment and child protective services workers more conscious of the risk of
concurrent incidents of violence. Instead of stopping the violent perpetrator,
the institutional response has often been to separate the mother caretakers
from their children. While violence by the same perpetrator cannot occur
simultaneously if the mother and children are in different places, the harm
of separation and the failure to address the dynamic which causes the vio-
lence may result in more tragedy.
Without a unifying theory to conceptualize the complexity and co-
morbidity of the violence, the coordination efforts have employed easy so-
lutions with tragic consequences. I highlight two such "solutions" here. The
first is prosecutions'7 8 of mothers for failing to protect their children from
family violence when the mother has never herself abused the children and
is a victim at the hands of the same abuser. The second is the loss of custody
by the parents to the child protective services agency ensuing, in part, from
the portrayal of the mother as a helpless victim.
Cases have begun to appear in many jurisdictions prosecuting women
who are in a relationship with a violent man with civil or criminal failure to
protect her children. 79 In some cases, this response has brought victims of
violence before the criminal courts due to the actions of their abusers and
deprived children of the vital caretaker in their lives. In others, the mother's
perceived "inaction" is viewed as failure to protect a child from witnessing
abuse or being concurrently abused. Her "action" in calling authorities and
seeking shelter or protective orders can alert child welfare authorities to the
presence of domestic violence in the home and lead to a civil child protec-
tion proceeding. Fear of losing children can prevent caretakers from seeking
the help they need to protect children.
Protection via removal should only be an extreme remedy necessary
when efforts at supporting the non-offending parent have failed or when the
domestic violence victim is herself abusive and needs services to rid vio-
lence from the home. Even in such extreme cases, removal should be
thought of as temporary, and aggressive reunification efforts need to be
provided and repeated as women seek to break out of the cycle of violence
and control. Children and mothers must be empowered in developing safety
plans that draw on their resources with the support of domestic violence and
178. The term "prosecution" is used to describe criminal cases brought against
women for failure to protect. There is an even larger body of case law in the civil
child protective services system using "failure to protect" as grounds for an adjudica-
tion and possible removal of the children. See, e.g., NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN AND
FAMILY LAW, supra note 69.
179. See id.
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child welfare systems.
Feminist theories provide a solid framework to examine all forms of
family violence. While not all family violence follows strict gender-based
identification of male perpetrator and female victim, that gendered para-
digm does in fact continue to describe a disproportionate amount of family
violence. Gender is a central factor in understanding family violence.
The feminist theory of power and control leading to escalating violence,
without its gendered underpinning, broadens the theory to encompass all
victims and perpetrators. The richness of the differences among women in
violent homes is also a vital component in conceptualizing and addressing
family violence. Together, gender,, power and control dynamics and an ap-
preciation of non-essentialism within feminist legal theory provide a
framework for understanding all forms of family violence.
From this framework, a new institutional response can be imagined. Two
scenarios are illustrative:
Police respond to a call for assistance by Rosa's mother
for a "domestic dispute." When they arrive, all is calm
but the mother seems very nervous and the father stands
be ween her and the police. Rosa is in the other room but
appears to be in no harm. The police ask the mother,
"Why did you call?" When she tells them there is no
problem and asks them to please leave, they warn her
that she cannot abuse the 911 service. They further ex-
plain that if they come back again, they will think about
reporting the family to child protective services to let
them investigate the mess.
Imagine instead an approach to family violence which recognizes the
centrality of gender in our society and assumes a dynamic of power and
control which can be asserted silently, without violence, whenever the per-
petrator makes his authority clear. The system would be able to deliver
services responsive to the needs of family members who sought assistance.
Empowerment would be a means to protection.
Well-trained police could view the role of their response as breaking the
cycle of power and control, thus limiting the abuser's authority. Their job
performance would not be judged based on the number of arrests they made
or successful prosecutions from their arrests but rather on their ability to
protect known victims and stop known abusers from becoming violent again
with the same or a new victim. If a family member failed to participate in
the subsequent stages of the intervention, that would reflect poorly on the
system not on the family member. Why did they decide their life was better
without the intervention, and how can the system be tailored to be more
responsive?
Another example similarly illustrates the danger of a poorly coordinated
response:
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The child protective services system is investigating a
call from a school reporting bruises on Rosa which she
says were caused by her mother hitting her with a
wooden spoon. When the child protective services inves-
tigator speaks to the mother, she is wearing sunglasses in
an attempt to hide a black eye. She appears to be on
drugs. The child protective services investigator warns
her that Rosa can be removed if she does not stop the
violence in her home and get her act together. She denies
any violence in the home and says Rosa was in a fight
after school with another child. The case is unfounded by
the child protective services system. Fearful that her life
is out of control, the woman calls the domestic violence
hotline and asks for a referral for counseling. She is told
that mental health professionals are mandated reporters
and she is at risk of losing her children to child protec-
tive services. She decides not to seek help.
If the child protective services investigator worked within an integrated
family violence services system which responded to all forms of family
violence, the investigator may have been able to offer services to the
mother, not as a victim or perpetrator, but as someone in need of help. Re-
moval of children should not be a threat or punishment but only a drastic
step, sometimes necessary, to secure the child's safety while the caretakers
get effective help. With an immediate goal of keeping the child with a fam-
ily caretaker, assessments must be made to define the "family" to be pre-
served. Again with a reference to the dynamic of power and control, can
removal of a violent adult allow a child to remain safely with a parent? If
that is not possible in the short term, what services can make it possible?
In Rosa's case, her mother's efforts to separate from the violence and
seek shelter should be supported. Working with her and Rosa, if Rosa is old
enough to communicate her wishes, what services and supports do they
need to remain safely together? The child protection system and domestic
violence system must dovetail efforts to protect children by empowering
them and their caretakers.
PART III. EMPOWERING AND PROTECTING OLDER CHILDREN
A. Necessary But Meager Protection: Background to the Foster Care
Independence Act (FCIA)8 °
At age eighteen or twenty-one, children have spent their right to protec-
tion and are considered autonomous adults, although few are prepared for
180. For a discussion of the FCIA and the needs of older foster children, see
Mangold, supra note 6 at 835 (summarized in part in this section).
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such empowerment. For many older children, relationships with birth fami-
lies are long-lasting if not strong. Adoptive families are hard to locate.
Therefore, permanency, through termination of parental rights and then
adoption, is not a viable alternative.18' For those who remain in foster care
because their families cannot safely care for them, the failure to successfully
reunify or to identify an adoptive family may mean that the children leave
foster care with no caretakers. For them, the goal of "independent living"
becomes the fall-back permanency option. Faced with this, the public
agency with custody of the child in foster care attempts to prepare the ag-
ing-out foster child with the skills and resources necessary to succeed on
their own. Instead of retaining protection of the child while increasing
empowerment, efforts collapse into preparing youth for independent living
with no parental guidance and only limited state assistance available.
Revisions in planning requirements specifically addressed the needs of
older children in foster care in the mid-1980's and the need to wean them
from the protection of the state toward independence through
empowerment. In 1986, the Independent Living Initiative (ILl) was
passed. 2 For children sixteen years and over, the ILl requires specific
planning to help these older children before they age out of the foster care
system. The provisions of the ILl provide funding for states to assist chil-
dren who were currently, or had in the past, received foster care mainte-
nance payments or had been in foster care. The goal of the ILl is "to help
the individuals participating... to prepare to live independently upon leav-
ing foster care."' 8 3 The programs suggested by the federal legislation for
states to provide to older foster children included programs to "enable par-
ticipants to seek a high school diploma[,] ... vocational training[,] ... pro-
vide training in daily living skills[and] ... provide each participant a written
transitional independent living plan which shall be based on an assessment
of his needs.''
The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999185 attempts to improve inde-
181. States have standards for termination of parental rights, which usually in-
clude abandonment, permanent incapacity to parent and failure to remedy the circum-
stances which placed a child into foster care. Federal law now requires that petitions
be filed if a child has been in placement for fifteen of the past twenty-two months, but
if contested, states will still need to meet their statutory grounds for termination. The
federal law includes exclusions from the termination requirement which are enumer-
ated in 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
182. Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title XII, § 12307(a), 100 Stat. 294 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 677).
183.42 U.S.C. § 677(d) (1991 & 1997 Supp.).
184. Id.
185. The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.106-169, 113 Stat.
1822 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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pendent living services. The plight of older foster children, and of those
newly empowered into independence, was detailed in the legislative hear-
ings for the Foster Care Independence Act. Unfortunately, many young
adults who age out of foster care do not successfully make the transition to
independent living by the time they age out of care. Too many reappear in
shelters, jails or on the streets. The needs of aging-out foster children were
at least partially recognized by Congress in passing the Foster Care Inde-
pendence Act of 1999. This law provides funding for services to assist
youths up to age twenty-one who are aging-out of the foster care system
into independent living. This law provides reimbursement to the state for
services for a few more years, but does not provide a creative solution to
address the need for ongoing protection. It does not transgress an arbitrary
birthday deadline to allow ongoing support for youths who still need state
protection.
In passing the law, Congress explicitly recognized that the overhauls of
the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act were not sufficient in ensuring
permanent homes for all foster children. In debate, Rep. Pryce remarked:
In 1997, Congress tried to help these children by passing legislation to fa-
cilitate the adoption of children in foster care. As a result, the dream of a
permanent family and a loving home is becoming a reality for more and
more children. Yet despite our best efforts to streamline the system and find
willing families to adopt these kids, the reality is that there are thousands of
children who will never leave the foster care system during their child-
hood. 186
Rep. Camp expressed similar understandings when he stated:
I was very proud to be a part of our efforts to revamp the Foster Care system
when this House passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act two years ago.
And our efforts are paying off- preliminary numbers show that adoption of
foster children have [sic] increased 40 percent since 1995.
But this bill takes the next step-it recognizes that no matter how hard we
work, some kids will turn 18 in foster care. They'll "age out" of the foster
care system without a network of family and loved ones to turn to.187
Despite widespread recognition of the need for "family and loved ones to
turn to, ' 88 the Foster Care Independence Act only provides for increased
186. 145 CONG. REC. 92, H4958 (daily ed. June 25, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Pryce).
187. Id. at H4971 (statement of Rep. Camp).
188. Many members of Congress echoed this plea to address the need for caring
parent-like adults for older foster children. "Those of us who have teenagers know that
when the child becomes 18, they still need the guidance, the support, the direction of
parents." Id. at H4968 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (debating Foster Care Independ-
ence Act of 1999 (H.R. 1802) (106th Congress, 1st Session)). Rep. Pryce stated, "[a]s
parents, we do not cut off our children once they turn 18, although I think it is safe to
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funds for enhanced programming by the states and not for family supports
for children who need them.
Many children still exit foster care with no home, adult assistance or real
promise of a future. There are approximately 500,000 children in out-of-
home care on any given day.'89 Nearly one-third of the children entering
care in any year or in care during that year are teens.' 90 Of the children
leaving care, almost 40% are teenagers. 191 Only eleven percent of these are
in care due to status offenses such as truancy or ungovernability or delin-
quency. 192 The remainder are in care mainly due to protective services, pa-
rental condition or absence, or relinquishment of parental rights. 193 Data is
available from the federal government from twenty-four states on the out-
comes for children of all ages exiting out-of-home care. In the six months
from April 1, 1996 through September 30, 1996, sixty-three percent who
say that even if we did, our children would have a better chance at survival than the
products of the foster care system." Id. at H4958; Rep. Rangel remarked, "[m]ost all
of us know as parents that a child becoming 18 does not necessarily mean that they are
ready to assume the responsibility of adulthood." Id. at H4960; Rep. Greenwood
added, "[w]hen we think of ourselves as parents, how many of us with our children,
who have the fortune to have had good, stable upbringings where they are loved, how
many of us say, here is your 18th birthday card, hit the street? We do not do that." Id.
at H4961; Rep. Cardin stated, "[hiow many of us as parents tell our children at 18 that
they are on their own? We have a responsibility." Id. at H4961; Rep. Foley remarked,
"[w]e can all remember how hard growing up can be. Fortunately for most of us we
had loving and supportive... family and parents to nurture, encourage, and teach us
how to gradually enter adulthood. I could never imagine the feelings of fear or uncer-
tainty that a foster care child approaching his or her 18th birthday must have." Id. at
H4961; Rep. Eshoo said, "[flor those of us with teenage children, we know that 18-
year-olds aren't often prepared to live on their own, paying their own bills." Id. at
H4964. In hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittees
on Human Resources, similar sentiments were expressed by William Pinto, Adolescent
Services Coordinator, Department of Children and Families, Hartford, CT (March 9,
1999): "For most young people in America, leaving one's home to be on your own
means voluntarily giving up the security of the family. You leave when emotionally
and economically ready for independence. The move out coincides with a positive
event, such as getting married or landing that first big job. When setting up the first
apartment, Mom has saved silverware and dishes, Aunt Millie has that pull-out couch
in the basement, and Dad may put a fresh coat of paint on the wall. Most importantly,
underneath it all is the security of knowing that if it doesn't work out, you can always
go back home. (And don't all the parents of young adults in this room know that they
often end up back at our front door?)." Id. at H4965 (statement by William Pinto).
189. See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 13, at 783 (noting that the most recent
statistics in the 1998 Green Book are for 1995 and previous years).
190. See id. at 786.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 790.
193. See id.
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left care were reunited with their families and eleven percent were
adopted.
94
In the Findings accompanying the Foster Care Independence Act, Con-
gress estimated that 20,000 teens leave foster care each year "because they
have reached the age of eighteen and are expected to support them-
selves."'195 The option of independent living is the fall-back option. For
these children, an expectation of successful independence is uniquely prob-
lematic.
Studies show that nearly 30 percent of these youths average nine years in
foster care without a permanent living arrangement. As a result, within two
years of leaving foster care, only half have completed high school, fewer
still are employed, and nearly 60 percent of the young women have given
birth, almost always outside of marriage.'96
Studies of children who have aged out of foster care are scarce' 9' but
findings are consistently disturbing.198 One study of all forty-six young men
discharged from an independent living group home in New York City found
that the overall mean length of time these young adults had spent in care
before discharge was eight years. 99 Three studies 00 relied upon by gov-
194. See id. at 796.
195. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 677).
196. Nancy Johnson, Foster Care Youth to Discuss Transition to Adulthood at
Hearing Tomorrow, GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, May 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2224152.
197. See Post-Foster Care Independent Living Programs: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Human Resources of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th
Cong. (1999) available in 1999 WL 16947799 (statement of Cynthia Fagnoni, Direc-
tor, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, Health, Education and Human
Services Division, U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Fagnoni Statement].
Many foster youths have a difficult time making the transition from the
foster care system to self-sufficiency. While there are few available studies
tracking youths who have exited foster care, our review of these studies re-
veals some consistent findings. Research has shown that many former fos-
ter care youths have serious education deficiencies and rely on public as-
sistance . . . .In addition, former foster care youths often find themselves
lacking adequate housing.
Id.
198. For a literature summary on the topic, see Richard P. Barth & Marianne
Berry, Implications of Research on the Welfare of Children Under Permanency Plan-
ning, in I CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH REV. 323, 345-48 (Richard Barth et al. eds.,
1994).
199. See Mallon, supra note 22 at 65.
200. See Fagnoni Statement, supra note 197; see also Westat, Inc., A National
Evaluation of Title IV-E Foster Care Independent Living Programs for Youth (Wash-
ington, D.C.: HHS, 1991), Richard P. Barth, On Their Own: The Experiences of Youth
After Foster Care, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK 419 (Oct. 1990), Mark E.
Courtney and Irving Piliavin, Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood: Outcomes 12 to
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ernment sources report the tragic next chapter for children exiting foster
care.
201
As success in the current job market becomes even more tightly con-
nected to educational attainment, children aging out of the foster care sys-
tem are ill-equipped to compete. The Westat study found that forty-six per-
cent of the 810 young adults studied who had left foster care had not com-
pleted high school.20 2 That number was thirty-seven percent for Courtney
and Piliavin who studied 113 former foster children and thirty-eight percent
for Barth who studied fifty-five former foster care youths.20 3 Employment
success was equally dire. Westat, the largest study, found fifty-one percent
unemployed two and a half to four years after leaving care.20 Sixty-two
percent had not maintained a job for at least one year.05 Courtney and
Piliavin found thirty-nine percent unemployed twelve to eighteen months
after aging-out of the system.20 6 Barth found twenty-five percent unem-
ployed one to ten years after leaving foster care.
207
Perhaps the two most disturbing correlations are between aging out of
foster care and homelessness 208 and incarceration. Westat found that twenty-
five percent of the former foster children had been homeless at least one
18 Months After Leaving Out-of-Home Care (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wiscon-
sin, 1998). For an explanation of the findings of the Courtney study, see Post-Foster
Care Independent Living Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Human Re-
sources of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) available in
1999 WL 16947799 (statement of Mark E. Courtney, Assistant Professor, School of
Social Work and Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
201. See Fagnoni Statement, supra note 197 (the government cites studies that
show that foster children exiting care who have received independent living program-
ming during their stay in foster care have better success than those who do not (citing
Maria Scannapieco et al., Independent Living Programs: Do They Make a Difference?
12 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 5 (Oct. 1995)).
202. See Fagnoni Statement, supra note 197.
203. See id.
204 See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. The correlation between discharge from foster care and homelessness has
long been recognized. See The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and Related
Proposals: Hearings on H.R. 2810 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and
Income Maintenance of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1985) (statement of Leonard Bradley, Deputy Commissioner of Tennessee Dept. of
Human Services on Child Welfare League of America) (state-by-state survey of state
agencies asked what they believed happened to children who age out of foster care)
(citing Mari Brita Maloney, Out of the Home Onto the Street: Foster Children Dis-
carded Into Independent Living, 14 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 971, 988-89 (1985)).
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night.20 9 Courtney and Piliavin found that twelve percent were homeless at
least once and that twenty percent of males and ten percent of females had
been incarcerated at least once in the twelve to eighteen months since exit-
ing care.210 Barth recorded that thirty-five percent had been homeless or
moved frequently and that thirty-five percent had spent time in jail or
211prison.
Invisible to these counts are the children who have no stable home but
live night-to-night on the generosity of friends or acquaintances. Called
"couch surfers" in child welfare lingo, these teens are at risk for every
frightening possibility of the street. 212 "The couch surfing phase is prelimi-
nary to being out in the street. ', 21 3 The numbers for teen pregnancy,214 in-
adequate health care and other indicators of maladjustment are similarly
disturbing.
In introducing H.R. 3443 which later became the Foster Care
Independence Act of 1999, Congress emphasized its concern for this
vulnerable group of former foster children and made the following findings:
(1) States are required to make reasonable efforts to find adoptive families
for all children, including older children, for whom reunification with their
biological family is not in the best interests of the child. However, some
older children will continue to live in foster care. These children should be
enrolled in an Independent Living program designed and conducted by State
and local government to help prepare them for employment, postsecondary
education, and successful management of adult responsibilities.
(2) Older children who continue to be in foster care as adolescents may be-
come eligible for Independent Living programs. These Independent Living
programs are not an alternative to adoption for these children. Enrollment in
209. See Fagnoni Statement, supra note 197.
210. See id.
211. See id.
* 212. See Susan K. Livio, Freedom Daunting for Ex-foster Child, HOME NEWS
TRIB., Jan. 3, 1999, at AI (many former wards of foster care would be homeless "were
it not for the generosity of friends and adults who have looked after [them] over the
years. Social workers call such young people 'couch surfers,' for their habit of sleep-
ing on a friend's couch until they wear out their welcome"); Susan K. Livio, Death,
Disappointment Stalk "Couch Surfers, " THE COURIER-NEwS, Nov. 14, 1998, at AI.
213. Susan K. Livio, Abusive Foster Care Left Teen ll-Equipped for Freedom,
THE COURIER-NEWS, Dec. 13, 1998 available in
http://www.injersey.com/news/story/0,1210,143770,00.html (last visited Dec. 14,
1998) (statement of Stephanie Schwartz of Crossroads, an outreach program for trou-
bled youth in Burlington, County).
214. See Sharon G. Elstein, Teenagers Are Adoptable: Strategies for Success, 18
CHILD L. PRAc. 49 (June 1999). A 1991 study found that two to four years after leav-
ing foster care, nearly 66% of teens were mothers compared to 25% in the general
population. See id.
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Independent Living programs can occur concurrent with continued efforts to
locate and achieve placement in adoptive families for older children in foster
care.
(3) About 20,000 adolescents leave the Nation's foster care system each year
because they have reached 18 years of age and are expected to support them-
selves.
(4) Congress has received extensive information that adolescents leaving
foster care have significant difficulty making a successful transition to
adulthood; this information shows that children aging out of foster care show
high rates of homelessness, non-marital childbearing, poverty, and delin-
quent or criminal behavior; they are also frequently the target of crime and
physical assaults.
(5) The Nation's State and local governments, with financial support from
the Federal Government, should offer an extensive program of education,
training, employment, and financial support for young adults leaving foster
care, with participation in such program beginning several years before high
school graduation and continuing, as needed, until the young adults emanci-
pated from foster care establish independence or reach 21 years of age.1 5
The purpose of the law was to enable states and localities to operate a
spectrum of training programs to better prepare children aging out of foster
care. The bill never included new or creative alternatives to create families
or supportive homes for these children and thereby provide for ongoing
protection. The purpose was described as follows:
(a) PURPOSE.-The purpose of this section is to provide States with flexi-
ble funding that will enable programs to be designed and conducted -
(1) to identify children who are likely to remain in foster care until 18 years
of age and to help these children make the transition to self-sufficiency by
providing services such as assistance in obtaining a high school diploma, ca-
reer exploration, vocational training, job placement and retention, training in
daily living skills, training in budgeting and financial management skills,
substance abuse prevention, and preventive health activities (including
smoking avoidance, nutrition education, and pregnancy prevention);
(2) to help children who are likely to remain in foster care until 18 years of
age receive the education, training and services necessary to obtain employ-
ment;
215. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This Act was introduced
January 6, 1999. S. 1327 has some additional information in the findings section (sec-
tion 3) which goes on after the first sentence in H.R. 3443 to state, "In addition, ap-
proximately 5,000 adolescents (foster children over the age of 12) are adopted out of
the foster care system each year, of whom approximately 620 are over the age of 16 at
the time of their adoption. A large percentage of these children have not yet completed
their high school education." S. 1327, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
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(3) to help children who are likely to remain in foster care until 18 years of
age prepare for and enter postsecondary training and education institutions;
(4) to provide personal and emotional support to children aging out of foster
care, through mentors and the promotion of interactions with dedicated
adults; and
(5) to provide financial, housing, counseling, employment, education, and
other appropriate support and services to former foster care recipients be-
tween 18 and 21 years of age to complement their own efforts to achieve
self-sufficiency and to assure that program participants recognize and accept
their personal responsibility for preparing for and then making the transition
from adolescence to adulthood . 6
Representative Johnson, co-author and lead co-sponsor of the legislation
with Representative Cardin, summarized the goal of the legislation as "to
prepare these young people to be able to move into the work force or to
continue with their education on the very day they leave foster care. These
children face very difficult problems and we must create programs to help
them learn to be self-reliant.,
217
The intent of the Foster Care Independence Act was to empower teens
and assist them into self-reliance. This is laudable and necessary but the
evidence shows these youths need much more. They are uniquely and tragi-
cally ill-equipped for empowerment with no ongoing protection. Only up to
thirty percent of any state's funding under this legislation can be used for
room and board for children ages eighteen to twenty-one. These funds are
valuable in helping to subsidize the former foster child's existence under a
notion of protection, but the focus is on empowerment, despite the teens'
documented need for protection.
Coupled with the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the Foster Care Inde-
pendence Act seems to provide an increased, but still inadequate, spectrum
of permanency options for older foster children. Children who are neither
reunited nor adopted (but instead age out of the system with no identified
216. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat.
1822. This Act was passed by the House of Representatives on November 18, 1999
and by the Senate on November 19, 1999. It was signed into law by President Clinton
on December 14, 1999. The earlier version debated on the floors of the House and
Senate (H.R. 1802) contained substantially similar "finding" and "purpose" sections.
H.R. 1802 was passed by the House in June. Both H.R. 3443 and H.R. 1802 were
titled "The Foster Care Independence Act." Finding (a)(2) was added in H.R. 3443 and
the final bill.
217. 145 CONG. REC. H4957-60 (daily ed. June 25, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Johnson). Like many of the speakers, a litany of bad outcomes for the foster children
was detailed by the speaker: "Today, two-thirds do not complete high school, 61 per-
cent have no job experience, and 38 percent are diagnosed emotionally disturbed.
Most end up jobless, addicted, pregnant, or in jail." Id.
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caretaker) are left to independent living. If they live with, or receive sup-
port of some kind from relatives or other informal custodians, there is no
public assistance for such accommodation.
218
B. Creative Remedies to Protect Older Children by Empowering Them
and Their Parents
1. Open Adoption
I use the term open adoption under the broadest definition, requiring nei-
ther a formal contract nor court order, but allowing for some ongoing con-
tact to facilitate the surrender of rights and the finalization of the adop-
tion.219 Open adoption requires the termination of parental rights but allows
for some continued contact between the birth family and the child. It could
be as minimal as letters and pictures or could involve ongoing visitation.
The term open adoption is used more generically to refer to any adoption in
which confidentiality is compromised by opening records, exchanging in-
formation, visiting, etc. Here, the purpose in suggesting open adoption is to
allow ongoing contact in whatever form will facilitate the finalization of the
218. Some localities use local money without state or federal reimbursement,
and some states use exclusively state money without federal reimbursement to fund
guardianships or other novel permanency plans. See, e.g., Meryl Schwartz, Reinvent-
ing Guardianship: Subsidized Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 456-74 (1996) (discussing state subsidies for
guardianship); Kathleen 0. Byrne and Matilda T. Bellucci, Subsidized Adoption: One
County's Program, 61 CHILD WELFARE 173, 173-74 (1982) (describing county subsidi-
zation for adoptions out of foster care before adoption subsidies were available under
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500).
219. See Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375
(1996). Sanger uses such an inclusive working definition to describe both direct and
indirect contact between the child, birth parents and adoptive parents. She makes the
point that open adoption may "increase the number of children available." See id. at
492. Others have echoed the prospect, emphasized here for older children, that open
adoption may provide stable familial relationships for some children who would not
otherwise have parents who could care for them. Lawrence W. Cook, Note, Open
Adoption: Can Visitation with Natural Family Members Be in the Child's Best Inter-
est? 30 J. FAM. L. 471, 478 (1992). But see Carol Amadio and Stuart L. Deutsch, Open
Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to "Stay in Touch" with Blood Relatives, 22 J.
FAM. L. 59, 60 (1983) (defining open adoption as an agreement in writing approved by
the court). Some distinguish open adoption from cooperative adoption. See, e.g.,
Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collabo-
rative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1001-02 (1995). In coopera-
tive adoption the ongoing contacts are arranged by mutual collaboration or agreement,
a contract which is made between the birth parent(s) and the adoptive parents. See id.
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adoption and, thus, some familial supports for older children in foster care.
Open adoption can empower birth parents and older children by creating an
acceptable adoptive arrangement. The adoption may be open by informal
agreement, contract or court order.220 Like traditional closed adoptions,
open adoptions should be eligible for all forms of adoption assistance and
subsidies, thus increasing the options available to provide familial protec-
tion for older children.
States only began to enact adoption statutes in the middle of the nine-
teenth century. In the twentieth century, legislatures amended the laws by
providing confidentiality for the process, thereby creating the notion of
closed adoptions.22' While closed adoptions were the norm in the 1970's,
some open adoptions were informally arranged and legally sanctioned at
that time.222 Only a few states legislatively endorse open adoptions.223
For all children in foster care with positive memories and bonds to their
birth families, open adoption may provide a mechanism for permanency
which does not require a total severance of ties with that family. This is
especially relevant in cases of adoption by relatives where confidentiality is
impossible.224 For older children aging out of foster care, open adoption
may provide a mechanism to allow the contacts that both the child and birth
parent want or to allow for ongoing sibling contact.225 Allowing these rela-
tionships to continue in some form may make the termination of parental
rights more tenable for both parties. This could facilitate an adoption, which
could not otherwise occur by assuring the parents that in surrendering their
rights and freeing their child for adoption, they will not lose all contact with
the child. This minimal empowerment may be what it takes to provide an
adoptive family for a child in foster care.
220. See Appell, supra note 219, at 1011.
221. See id. at 1006.
222. Annette Baran et al., Open Adoption, 21 SOC. WORK 97, 98-99 (1976) (ad-
vocating that open adoption should be accepted as an alternative and discussing an
"experiment" in which an author arranged an open adoption).
223. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-5-35(A) (Michie 1999); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(c)(3)(b) (McKinney 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-121(f) (Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295(1)
(West 1997). Other states have sanctioned open adoption through case law. See, e.g.,
Adoption of Gwendolyn, 558 N.E. 2d 10 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that post-
adoption visitation permitted but at the discretion of adoptive parents); Michaud v.
Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988) (ruling that contract between birth and adoptive
parents was not contrary to public policy).
224. See Appell, supra note 219, at 1011.
225. The importance of sibling bonds is one that is rarely paramount in the child
welfare system. For a discussion of the importance of the bonds and their implications
for advocacy, see Sharon G. Elstein, Making Decisions About Siblings in the Child
Welfare System, 18 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 97 (Sept. 1999).
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2. Guardianship
Guardianship is a judicially sanctioned arrangement; an adult can act as a
guardian for a child for the duration of the court order. Guardianship was
originally used to oversee a minor's property or estate when his/her parents
were deceased or could not otherwise perform this function. Probate guardi-
anships, as they are sometimes called, do not involve physical custody of
the child, but are the antecedent to the current use of guardianships by the
226family or juvenile courts. Probate guardianships, like the guardianships
now ordered in the child welfare system, could be for a defined period of
time or ongoing. Guardianship traditionally terminates no later than a
child's eighteenth birthday. Just as foster care can continue to age twenty-
one by continuation of the placement order, the court arranging the guardi-
anship could have jurisdiction to continue the guardianship to age twenty-
one or even beyond.
Today, guardianships are often provided by relative caretakers who have
been kinship foster care resources. Guardianship provides for a more per-
manent status to the arrangement. 227 Guardianship also allows for the dis-
charge of the child from the child welfare system in many instances, ending
supervision by the agency and the court except for the negligible supervi-
sion that may be provided by the court overseeing the guardianship. 228 It is
usually a single guardian or mother and father unit which are identified to
provide guardianship. This does not require termination of parental rights
and, in that sense, is less disempowering of parents. Like open adoption, it
provides another option which older children and parents could choose and
plan for with the child welfare agency. Often relatives prefer guardianship
226. See, e.g., ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 767-77
(1999); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 691 (1999); Bogart
R. Leashore, Demystifying Legal Guardianship: An Unexplored Option for Dependent
Children, 23 J. FAM. L. 391 (1984).
227. The Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 11i Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). Section 101(b)
of the Act added a definition of legal guardianship to the law. It is now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 675 (7) (1994 & Supp. 1998). While useful for clarification and uniformity
of rights to be conferred onto guardians, no subsidization of guardianship is provided
in federal law.
228. Professor Martha Fineman challenges us to separate state support from state
supervision of families. For creative permanency planning for children who are over
the age of eighteen, support and supervision must exist along a continuum to meet the
individual needs of children and the adults sharing the parental responsibilities for
them. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1207 (1999).
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to adoption because they do not have to endure a legal battle to terminate
the parental rights of their sibling or other relative. Biological parents may
be willing to consent to a guardianship by a sibling or other relative but not
to adoption which severs their parental rights. Biological parents may par-
ticipate in the selection of a guardian229 and may enjoy ongoing visitation
with the child. In families where property is available, guardianship also
allows the child to inherit from the parent and does not release the parent
from financial support.
Guardianships are frequently used by the child welfare system, but are
not generally supported by federal subsidy as are adoptions.230 Guardian-
ships are not currently subsidized by the federal government except by
waiver.23 1 An end to state intervention and supervision of a well-functioning
guardianship may be a permanency triumph; a custodial relationship moves
from foster care to guardianship. Unfortunately, with the discharge from
foster care comes an end to the subsidy which had been available for kin-
ship foster care but is not available for guardianship. This loss of funding
may prohibit some relatives from making the move to guardianship and
eliminate this option for older children and their parents to exit the child
welfare system.
A demonstration project in Illinois providing for subsidized guardianship
estimates that 4,000 children will move out of kinship foster care and into
more permanent and stable subsidized guardianships under the program.232
Other states allow for subsidization of guardians although their state funds
are not reimbursed by the federal government.233
229. For terminally ill parents, stand-by guardianships or joint guardianships are
used to plan for the child's care when the parent is no longer able to do so. See, e.g.,
Sunny Rosenfeld, Developments in Custody Options for HIV-Positive Parents, I 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 194 (1996). It is common practice for parents drafting a will
to name guardians for their children. See, e.g., Esther Appelberg, The Significance of
Personal Guardianship for Children in Casework, 49 CHILD WELFARE 6 (1970) (advo-
cating that social workers and caseworkers should encourage parents to draw up wills
and name guardians for their children even when there is little or no property to pass
on to the children).
230. The idea of subsidized guardianship has been circulated for years but never
adopted by the federal government. See, e.g., Maria Gottlieb Zwas, Kinship Foster
Care: A Relatively Permanent Solution, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1993); Leashore,
supra note 224. For a discussion of subsidized guardianship as an exclusion from a
declining subsidized reimbursement scale, see Gordon, supra note 227.
231. See Schwartz, supra note 218, at 456-74; Byrne & Bellucci, supra note 218.
232. Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the Sub-
comm. On Human Resources, 105th Cong. 38 (1998) (statement of Jess McDonald,
Director, Illinois Dep't. of Children and Family Services).
233. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.062 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-814 (West Supp. 2000); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11405 (West 2001); MONT.
2001]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
3. Mentorship
The word "mentor" has a Greek origin meaning steadfast and enduring.
234
In Homer's Odyssey, Odysseus leaves behind his friend, Mentor, to be the
guide and educator of his son, Telemachus. Today, the term is used to de-
scribe a variety of adult-child supportive relationships 231 in which the adults
offer themselves as short or long-term role models for children and offer
some guidance to the child.236 Such mentoring programs have existed in the
U.S. at least since the turn of the century with the development of the Big
Brother Program in 1902.237 They are increasingly proposed and utilized 238
as a preventive measure against juvenile crime, unemployment,240 school
CODE ANN. § 41-3-421 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-45 (Michie 1978 & Supp.
1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-2-17 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000). See also Timmons
v. McMahon, 235 Cal. App. 3d 512, 286 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1991) (allowing payments to
temporary, nonrelated guardians).
234. BREWER'S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 721 (14th ed. 1989).
235. Mentoring in the one-on-one model may not be possible for all children.
Alternatives are being explored with less intensive interaction. For a study of one such
program in New York City, see Antronette K. Yancey, Building Positive Self-Image in
Adolescents in Foster Care: The Use of Role Models in an Interactive Group Ap-
proach, 33 ADOLESCENCE 253 (1998).
236. Evaluations of such programs are scarce. For a review of a variety of pro-
grams, see Dionne J. Jones et al., Reaffirming Young African American Males:
Mentoring and Community Involvement by Fraternities and Other Groups, 16 URB.
LEAGUE REV. 9, 12 (1993).
237. See David Royse, Mentoring High-Risk Minority Youth: Evaluation of the
Brothers Project (Big Brother Agency), 33 ADOLESCENCE 145 (1998).
238. One positive example of a mentoring program is the NYC Independent
Living Partnership where youths and their adult mentors meet semiannually for a
weekend retreat, and monthly for an informal support group or network of support.
See Mallon supra note 22, at 75. This model provides a network not only of adult
mentors but also of former foster children who can support one another in the commu-
nity. The PRIDE program (Personal and Racial/Ethnic Identity Development and En-
hancement) uses successful mentors from the foster child's same cultural background
to provide positive role models. This is not a one-on-one program, nor is it a one-day
seminar. Instead, the program uses a series of group sessions to provide interaction
between the foster child and mentor. It is not an intensive form of mentoring, but its
effects have been positive. But see David L. DuBois & Helen A. Neville, Youth
Mentoring: Investigation of Relationship Characteristics and Perceived Benefits, 25 J.
OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 227, 227-28 (defining mentoring as a "one-to-one relation-
ship between a [youth] and a caring adult who assists the [youth] in meeting academic,
social, career, or personal goals") (citing S.M. Nettles, Community Contributions to
School Outcomes of African-American Students, 24 EDUC. & URB. SOC 'Y 139 (1991)).
See also Yancey, supra note 235, at 253.
239. See Michelle Lea Cherne Anderson, The High Juvenile Crime Rate: A Look
at Mentoring as a Preventive Strategy, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 54 (1994).
240. See Patricia Rowe, Volunteer Mentors Empower Inner-City Youths, 19
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dropout 241 and teen pregnancy.242
The term is used here to describe a supportive adult and to distinguish the
mentors from those with guardianship or some other form of parental rights
over the child. For children who do not want such adults in their lives or
who do not have adults in their lives able or willing to enter into more for-
mal parenting relationships of guardianship or adoption, mentors provide
some adult supervision and support which could be extremely necessary at
difficult times such as the transition out of foster care. The term usually
refers to volunteer adults. 43 Youths receiving independent living services
are often served in an aggregate setting with little one-to-one adult
mentoring or care.2" Resources for mentor programs are often scarce or
non-existent despite the fact that "officials in all locations saw some type of
mentoring program as one method to provide youths with a vocational role
model and opportunities to practice other independent living skills they
have learned. 245
Volunteer opportunities should be encouraged; but, a more structured,
federally subsidized form of mentoring where one or a variety of adults is
paid to provide work, school or emotional support to a teen aging out of the
foster care system is necessary. Subsidized mentors could insure that no
child exits foster care without some committed adult support.
Such mentors could be identified by the public child welfare agency in
the same way that foster parents are identified, either by direct contract with
the public agency or through subcontracts with not-for-profit and new
profit-making entities which provide a variety of services to the child wel-
fare system.246 Adults interested in assisting children but unable or unwill-
ing to make the commitment as foster or adoptive parents could still play a
CHILD. TODAY 20 (1990) (describing an externship/mentoring program for Washing-
ton, D.C. youth to receive job training and experience along with career mentoring).
241. See Elaine A. Blechman, Mentors for High-Risk Minority Youth: From
Effective Communication to Bicultural Competence, 21 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHIATRY
160, 160 (1992).
242. See Jean E. Rhodes et al., Natural Mentors: An Overlooked Resource in the
Social Networks of Young, African American Mothers, 20 AM.. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 445 (1992).
243. See MARC FREEDMAN, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS xii (1993).
244. See Fagnoni statement, supra note 197.
245. See id.
246. The Guide Program for foster adolescents is operated by People Places of
Charlottesville, Virginia. Teens in the Guide Program live with a responsible, trained
adult for eighteen months before they age out of foster care. The adult serves as a
"mentor, a sounding board, and a safety net for the teen." Post-Foster Care Independ-
ent Living Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Human Resources of the
House Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999) available at 1999 WL
16947802 (statement of Kelli Sutton Block, People Places of Charlottesville, Va.).
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crucial role in the life of a teen. Whenever possible, the teens could identify
mentors who might be willing to assist them in their transition to adulthood.
Foster parents of siblings or foster parents of other teenagers are examples.
The realization that some children leave foster care without caring adults
available to assist them challenges the very notion of permanency planning
which, in some circles, means that all children who cannot be returned to
their biological families are adoptable. 247 At least since 1986 with passage
of the Independent Living Initiative, reality has overtaken theory to provide
that "independent living" is a suitable goal for permanency planning. In
other words, the goal for many children aging out of foster care is "inde-
pendent living" because the child welfare system concludes that there is no
family or permanent home for these teens. The system formulates a perma-
nency plan with that realization in place, based on a right to empowerment
triggered solely by age. Permanency planning needs to accommodate op-
tions that recognize that empowerment and protection are ongoing, compli-
mentary goals.
By arguing that children need responsible adults supported by the state
even after age eighteen, this article posits that the right to protection, so
integral to the child welfare system, does not cease on a child's eighteenth
birthday. Empowerment is important and teenage children should certainly
be participants in their own permanency planning, but that does not require
cessation of the exercise of a right to protection. As child welfare support
via the Foster Care Independence Act can continue to age twenty-one, so
may the suggested recommendations continue past age eighteen to at least
twenty-one when the child is in agreement and the adult support is approved
by the child welfare agency or court.
If properly funded, then open adoptions, guardianships and mentorships
that accommodate empowerment and protection are potential and plausible
arrangements for many children for whom reunification or traditional,
closed adoptions are undesirable or unattainable. If the law could recognize
parents as important but not exclusively so, the outcomes for older children
could be healthier and more permanent. Instead of focusing on termina-
tion/adoption or independent living, older children would benefit from a
system that does not disqualify any adult who wishes to be a positive pres-
ence, no matter how limitedly, in a child's life. Children aging out of foster
care are a group that could significantly benefit from a cooperatively
planned, shared custody relationship, developed with their input and facili-
tated and funded by the state.
247. See Katharine Miller et al., Overcoming Barriers to Permanency Planning,
63 CHILD WELFARE 45 (1984).
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PART IV. CONCLUSION
The Conference, Transgressing Borders: Women's Bodies, Identities and
Families, gave us all a rare opportunity to come together in memory of
Mary Jo Frug and her work and speak openly about the foster care system
and many other issues impacting the lives of women and families. I am
hopeful that our presentations and conversations that day can continue and
will influence the current debates on the foster care system. Throughout
history, the foster care system in a variety of forms has been used to exer-
cise the parens partiae power of the state to intervene into families and
protect children. The protection of children has always been balanced
against parental rights and empowerment. In this article, I try and shift the
debate to consider protection and empowerment of both caretakers and
older children as complimentary goals.
Dealing with domestic violence and its impact on children and the needs
of older foster children are some of the many challenges facing the foster
care system. Our current approaches are not working. We need renewed
investment and creative permanency planning to address these complicated
issues. Foster care is a vital resource but a temporary and radical one. The
only way to possibly ensure lasting, safe and healthy plans to protect chil-
dren is to empower caretakers and older youth.
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